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Title of Dissertation: Better Balanced Representation in the IMO Forum 
IMO, the specialized agency of UN responsible for the global maritime safety and 
marine environmental protection, announced an initial strategy in 2018, aiming to 
reduce shipping’s GHG emission by at least 50% by 2050, compared to the 2008’s 
levels. The society demands even more as required by the Paris Agreement. IMO, 
however, decided to postpone the adoption of the revised strategy until 2023 due to 
lack of internal consensus. 
In this context, TI assessed IMO’s governance and reported that IMO requires reform 
as its policy-making is too much influenced by private interests. Given the above, this 
dissertation attempts to make a comprehensive analysis of IMO’s existing 
decision-making processes and participants therein.  
The roles of private interest groups in the IMO decision-making are examined, taking 
into account the fact that, since IMO is a forum to create the regulatory framework for 
shipping, consultation with the industry is considered inevitable in its policy-making. 
Relevant information is explored, including IMO documents and instruments, 
industry’s reports, research papers and other necessary maritime literature, with a view 
to ascertaining whether conflicts of interests exist across the IMO forums.  
Recognizing both the merits and demerits of industry’s involvement in IMO 
rule-making, careful investigation is made into the existing mechanism within IMO 
for the trade-off between the safety and benefit goals, together with relevant good 
examples of ILO, another specialized agency of UN. Special attention is called to 
IMO’s FSA and ILO’s tripartite system which are suggestive of well-balanced 
mechanisms between public and private interests.  
 IV 
The concluding chapter, summarizing the results of the above investigation, attempts 
to offer some recommendations which are considered as appropriate methodologies of 
ensuring better balanced representation in IMO forums. 
Degree: Master of Science 
 
KEYWORDS : IMO policy-/rule-/decision-making, conflicts of interest, public 
interest, private interest, balanced representation, trade-off
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
IMO’s commitment to SDGs  
In September 2015, all the United Nations (UN) member States, developed and 
developing, unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by 
the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) resolution A/RES/70/1 at a Summit for 
Sustainable Development, including the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
and 169 related targets. The SDGs aim at improving health and education, promoting 
equality, protecting environment and spurring economic prosperity with poverty put 
an end to. Therefore, the 2030 agenda is called a plan of action for “people, planet and 
prosperity” (IMO, 2015)
1
. Today, the Division for Sustainable Development Goals 
(DSDG) in the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) offers 
substantial support for the SDGs, focused on water, energy, climate, oceans, 
urbanization, transport, science and technology. DSDG plays a key role in the global 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda. In order for all the SDGs to come true in time, 
they should be incorporated into a strong commitment by all stakeholders to ensure 
their effective global engagement. DSDG aims at promoting this engagement (UN, 
2015)
2
. Among the above mentioned stakeholders the most considerable is shipping 
entities.  
 
1 Further information is given in the IMO website: 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/41-SDGS.aspx 
2 Further information is given in the UN website: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/about 
 2 
 
Table 1. SDGs provided in UNGA resolution A/RES/70/1 
 3 
Source: United Nations (25 October 2015). Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (Resolution A/Res/70/1). Retrieved May 14, 2019 from the 
World Wide Web. 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld 
As a saying goes, oceans do not so much as divide as unite the world. It reminds the 
world community of shipping’s significance. In fact, shipping is regarded as the 
backbone of the global trade. All year round, ships transport goods to everywhere of 
the world, encouraging consistent economic growth and spreading prosperity across 
the countries. This way, shipping contributes to achieving all the SDGs from ending 
poverty and hunger to strengthening the global partnership for sustainable 
development. 
Given the above, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency 
of the UN responsible for the global maritime safety and security and marine 
environmental protection, has recognized the importance of its engagement in SDGs 
and continuously striven to establish, implement and update its maritime policies to 
help achieve the SDGs at the national, regional and global level.  
IMO’s efforts to help achieve UN’s goals already commenced in 2000 when the UN 
adopted the Millennium Declaration by UNGA resolution A/RES/60/1 including eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to reduce extreme poverty by 2015. In 
September 2000 IMO committed itself to contribution to achieving the MDGs by 
adopting and implementing its Assembly resolution A.1006(25) on the Linkage 
between the Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme (ITCP) and the MDGs 
(IMO, TC 65/5). IMO, at the 65th session of its Technical Cooperation Committee (TC 
65) held in 2015, reviewed its engagement in the achievement of the MDGs and 
reported that its ITCP had successfully supported, in particular, five MDGs (IMO, TC 
65/16, pp.13-14). In the following year, it identified the linkage between ITCP and 
SDGs at TC 66 which highlighted that SDGs 5, 13, 14 and 17 were especially relevant 
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to IMO’s work while many other SDGs were also noted to be IMO work related (IMO, 
TC 66/5(c)). Finally IMO member States sat together at the 30
th
 session of IMO 
Assembly (A 30) in December 2017 and agreed to the cooperation for the SDGs 
achievement, by adopting IMO Assembly resolutions A.1110(30) on Strategic Plan 
for the Organization for the Six-year Period 2018 to 2023 and A.1126(30) on 
Linkages between the Technical Assistance Work of IMO and the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. 
The public pressure that IMO faces now 
Despite all its above efforts, IMO’s SDG-related business does not seem to keep pace 
with the times. 
Shipping is related to any of the 17 SDGs as shown in Table 1 but IMO’s greatest 
concern is focused on SDG 13 on climate change and SDG 14 on ocean conservation. 
 
Table 2. Shipping CO2/CO2e emissions compared with global CO2/CO2e (values in 
million tonnes CO2/CO2e) 
Source: IMO (2014). MEPC 67/INF.3, p.12 
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Shipping is regarded as the most effective and efficient transportation as it contributes 
to approximately 2.5% of the global CO2 emission as shown in table 2 (IMO, MEPC 
67/INF.3, p.12) while it carries around 80% of global trade by volume and over 70% of 
global trade by value (UNCTAD, 2017, p.x). However, if left unregulated, its 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission will increase to account for 17% of the whole by 
2050 (TI, 2018, p.2).  
In light of the above, IMO sought for an effective mechanism of ensuring a real 
contribution to the global GHG emission decrease, given the fact that the Paris 
Agreement (2015) entered into force on 4 November 2016. The Paris Agreement aims 
at holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2℃ above 
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5℃ 
above pre-industrial levels. Since it does not take sectoral approaches, IMO member 
States invited the Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC), IMO’s 
organ responsible for addressing any environmental protection related issues, to 
define the shipping sector’s fair share in the global efforts to reduce GHG emission. 
One year later, at the 70
th
 session of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee 
(MEPC 70) in 2016, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) et al. suggested 
that a road map for IMO’s fair share should be determined while Angola et al. 
proposed to develop a roadmap for enhancing the energy efficiency of international 
shipping. MEPC 70, having considered these proposals in details and other related 
comments thereabout, developed the draft roadmap for ship GHG emission reduction 
strategy to be finalized by 2023 after the following three phases (IMO, MEPC 70/18, 
pp.44-51; MEPC 70/19/Add.1, Annex 11): 
Phase 1 data collection (January 2019); 
Phase 2 data analysis (no later than autumn 2020); and 
Phase 3 decision step (Spring 2022). 
 6 
Based on the above preparation, in April 2018 IMO adopted the Initial IMO Strategy 
on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships by resolution MEPC.304(72) which aims 
to decrease shipping’s GHG emission by at least 50% by 2050, compared with the 
2008’s levels. This strategy is likely needed to be immediately revised upwards in 
order to decarbonise the maritime sector in line with below 2°C and/or 1.5°C 
temperature goals of the Paris Agreement. However, the adoption of the revised 
strategy is planned to come true five years later.  
The significance of IMO’s role cannot be overestimated in achieving the SDG 13 and 
the world community, therefore, hopes that IMO will make greater strides to a 
zero-GHG initiative by 2050.    
1.2 TI’s assessment on the governance of IMO 
In this context, the Transparency International (TI) evaluated IMO’s governance 
structure to consider whether it will help or hinder the policy making. To the surprise it 
made public a report arguing that IMO needs reform (TI, 2018, p.4)
3
. TI indicates in its 
report the following four key problems to be solved: 
The uneven influence of member States; 
The influence of open registries; 
The disproportionate influence of industry; and 
The lack of delegate accountability. 
The uneven influence of member States 
The report indicates that IMO’s rule-making processes are unfair. It takes as an 
example the fact that IMO’s policy-making is dominated by a small number of States 
 
3
 Transparency International (2018). Governance at the International Maritime Organization. The case 
for reform. Berlin: Author. 
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which make big contributions to IMO’s budget and other decisions based on the size of 
their fleets. Nine of the top ten contributing States are members of the Council which is 
the executive body of IMO. Further, the Council publishes no substantive information 
about its activities. Entry-into-force of IMO treaties are also much influenced by the 
States with greater tonnages since none of them take effect until they have been 
acceded to by those States that collectively regulate a specified percentage of the 
world’s shipping fleet. 
The influence of open registries 
The report points at the existing open registry system as a serious problem. Open 
registries and international registries allow States to offer substandard ships favorable 
regulatory environments which biases the ship registry into profit earning rather than 
enforcement purpose. This mechanism has a serious impact on IMO’s work. For 
example, the biggest four open registries including Panama, Liberia, the Marshall 
Islands and the Bahamas can exercise influence over IMO through the funding and 
treaty ratification system.  
Member State 
Contribution amount 
(Unit: £ million) 
Percentage in IMO 
budget 
Panama 5.3 19.3 
Liberia 2.5 8.8 
Bahamas 1.4 4.9 
Marshall Islands 1.3 4.8 
UK 1.3 4.8 
Greece 1.2 4.3 
Singapore 1.1 4.1 
Malta 0.97 3.5 
Japan 0.94 3.4 
China 0.91 3.3 
Table 3. Some member States’ contribution to IMO budget 
Source: Du Dachang (2018). Marine Environment Protection Standards. 
Class handout, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China 
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The disproportionate influence of industry 
According to the above report, private interest groups have easy access to IMO’s 
rule-making process thorough the consultative status that IMO endowed them with. As 
shown in Table 4, the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with the consultative 
status in IMO forums totals 814. Analysis of five recently held IMO meetings shows 
that industry representatives considerably outnumbered civil society organization 
(CSO) representatives, as shown in Table 11
5
 (TI, 2018, p.25). 
Categories of NGOs with IMO’s consultative status Number 
Cargo and port (IAPH, ICHCA, CEFIC, IICL, IOGP, SIGTTO, 
DGAC, WNTI, IBTA, IVODGA, IBIA, BIC, IIMA) 
13 
Environment (FOEI, ITOPF, IUCN, ACOPS, Greenpeace, WWF, 
IPIECS, IOI, IFAW, ISCO, Pacific Environment, CSC, Pew) 
13 
Insurance (IUMI, P & I Clubs) 2 
Legal (CMI, IIDM) 2 
Navigation (IALA, CIRM, IMPA) 3 
Professional and Representative bodies (IFSMA, IMarEST, IHMA, 
RINA, ITF, NI, WISTA International) 
7 
Rescue (ISU, IMRF) 2 
Security (IAASP) 1 
Shipbuilding (CESA, SYBAss, ASEF) 3 
Ship owners/ship operators (ICS, BIMCO, OCIMF, IADC, 
INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO, CLIA, InterManager, IPTA, IMCA, 
INTERFERRY, WSC) 
12 
Standards (ISO, IEC, IACS, ICOMIA, ILAMA, EUROMOT, 
WORLD SAILING, ITTC, IPPIC, NACE INTERNATIONAL, 
IWMA, SGMF) 
12 
Trade (ICC, IRU, ISSA, FONASBA, IPCSA) 5 




Table 4. The number of NGOs in consultative status by interests/activities 
 
4
 Further information is given in the IMO website: https://docs.imo.org/Category.aspx?cid=746 
5 More detailed consideration to this issue is given in section 4.2 of this dissertation. 
 9 
Source: Author compiled from IMO (2018) 
Another eye-catcher is that private company delegates represent their governments at 
IMO meetings as there are no rules governing the appointment of national delegations. 
The lack of delegate accountability 
TI’s report states that IMO member State delegates are shielded from public scrutiny. 
Journalists are forbidden from naming speakers at meetings without gaining their 
consent. As a result, the public do not know which delegates are arguing for which 
issues.  
TI’s recommendations 
Out of the above analysis, TI recommends IMO to: 
a.) engage in a process of open dialogue with its external stakeholders on how it 
can improve transparency; 
b.) take steps to ensure that its decision-making processes better reflect the 
public interest; and 
c.) ensure that all those who engage in decision-making are subject to robust 
integrity rules and measures. 
In particular, it makes the point that IMO should develop and implement rules 
governing the appointment of national delegates of its member States and their 
behavior as well as better balanced representation among different interest groups. It 
further recommends that IMO should consider developing a Code of Conduct for 
Council members, Member State delegates and consultative members in order to 
regulate their conduct while operating under the auspices of IMO. 
It is of great significance to ensure properly balanced representation in the IMO forum 
not only in achieving SDGs on GHG reduction but also in promoting safety and 
 10 
security. Biased representation surely leads to disaster of over-regulations or of 
under-regulations either of which will hinder safe, secure, clean and efficient shipping. 
Given the above, this dissertation attempts to analyse the IMO’s governance with a 
focus on the influence of private interests on IMO policies, based on TI’s report. 
  
 11 
CHAPTER 2. SAFE AND EFFICIENT SHIPPING－IMO’S 
IMPORTANT TELEOLOGY 
The most notable in the above report inter alia is the issue on conflicts of interests. The 
report exposes the holes of the current ways in which member governments appoint 
their delegates to IMO meetings. Brazil, for example, sent to MEPC 71 five advisers 
from Vale S.A, a multinational company with substantial shipping interest while the 
Marshall Islands appointed twelve delegates eight of which were employees of the 
International Registry Inc Group, a private shipping registry (IMO, MEPC 71/INF.1). 
Such examples can be easily found at other IMO meetings which were recently held
6
. 
TI recommends that IMO should consider the introduction of requirements for 
member State representatives to hold an official public mandate as members of their 
domestic civil service and to demonstrate an absence of conflicts of interest in their 
role as national delegates.   
In order to ensure a sound policy making process, great attention should be paid to the 
actors who participate there. Hesse (2018) states that, since governance is the process 
of adopting and implementing policy, an analysis of governance is to focus on the 
actors involved in that process as well as the structures set in place to arrive at and 
implement the policy. In this sense, it is much worthy of looking into participants in 
IMO rule-making as well as their related matters including participation, rule of law, 
accountability, effectiveness and efficiency and transparency. TI, warning IMO of the 
undesirable compositions of the participants at its meetings, expressed a concern about 
the possibility of private companies’ resistance of clean technology which may require 
long-term investment.  
TI’s analysis and recommendation entail that, in order to ensure the public interest in 
the policy making of IMO on a fair basis, the private companies including particularly 
 
6
 See appendix 1 to this dissertation. 
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ship owners or operators should be ruled out from the IMO decision making processes. 
At a cursory glance it may sound reasonable but the reality is much more complex than 
what it seems like. 
2.1 Inseparable relation between shipping and economic growth 
Shipping derives from the demands of the trade. It cannot create its own demands. Ups 
and downs of shipping always depend on those of trade. Good examples thereabout 
can be easily found from a glance which is given to what is going on in the global 
economy and international seaborne trade these days.   
 
Table 5. World economic growth, 2016-2017 (Annual percentage change in GDP) 
Source: Author compiled from UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2018, p.4. 
The world maritime transportation gained momentum in 2017. It expanded at 4% in 
 13 
volumes, which is the fastest increase in recent five years. This increase came from the 
world economic growth. Global industrial activity and manufacturing increased in 
2017 by 2.8%, up from 0.2% in 2016. In China, industrial production was up at 6.5%, 
while Brazil witnessed 2.4% increase in 2017. As a result the world witnessed a 
considerable upswing in GDP with 3.1% increase in 2017, up from 2.5% in 2016 as 
shown in Table 5 (UNCTAD, 2018, p.3).   
Table 6. International seaborne trade growth (millions of tons loaded), 2016-2017 
Source: Author compiled from UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2018, p.5. 
The recent global economic growth brought prosperity to shipping. The volume of the 
global seaborne trade reached 10.3 billion tons in 2016. This figure increased upto 
10.7 billion tons in 2017, reflecting additional 411 million tons as shown in Table 6. 
Each type of cargo transported by ship also saw continuous increase in recent years as 
listed in Table 7. All these upward trend led to growth in world fleet capacity. After 
five years of decelerating growth, the world fleet experienced increase by additional 
42 million gross tons in 2017 responding to the trade growth, as presented in Figure 1. 
 14 
 
Figure 1. Annual growth of world fleet and seaborne trade, 2000-2017 (percentage) 
Source: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2018, p.23. 
The facts and figures clearly illustrate the close relations between shipping and trade. 
IMO aims to create a “regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair, 
effective, universally adopted and implemented.” (IMO, 2019)
7
 IMO, in its Assembly 
resolution A.1110(30), states that its mission is to promote safe, secure, 
environmentally sound, efficient and sustainable shipping through cooperation. 
Efficient and sustainable shipping that IMO refers to means economically beneficial 
and, thus, consistently growing shipping. In order for this mission to be fulfilled, IMO 
cannot help but fully consult and consider the commercial interests such as, in 
particular, ship owners, ship operators, seafarers agencies, etc. and reflect their views 
in their technical regulations.  
 
7 Further information is given in the IMO website: http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx 
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Table 7. World seaborne trade, 2016-2017 (Type of cargo, country group and region) 
Source: Author compiled from UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2018, p.6 
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2.2 Regulatory framework in shipping 
In general, maritime regulations can be divided into three distinctive categories: 
technical, economic and social regulations, under which they can be further divided 
into sub-groups such as the regulations developed by professional entities and those by 
governmental agencies (Ma, 2018, p.138). As shown in Figure 2, shipping utilizes or is 
controlled by rules and regulations of all these three categories. Yet the shipping 
standards set by IMO fall under the category of technical regulations. 
 
Figure 2. Regulatory framework in shipping 
Source: Author compiled from Ma Shuo (2018). Maritime Economics. Class handout, Dalian 
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Maritime University, Dalian, China. 
Technical regulations are standards set by the industry for the purpose of its own 
well-being. The development of these standards requires professional expertise. The 
best example is classification rules and regulations. At international level, IMO is the 
only body responsible for technical requirements of shipping. These requirements are 
transposed into the domestic standards by governments. 
Shipping is also bound by regulations established to achieve economic objectives. The 
examples are the Convention on the Arrest of Ships (1999) and the Convention on 
Maritime Liens and Mortgages (1993) adopted by the NU Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). Quite recently the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s 





 and most-favored nation
10
 will be 
widely applied to shipping sooner or later. Regulations of the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are applied in the shipbuilding 
aspect in the field of government subsidy for the shipyard credit. Nowadays efforts are 
being made to eliminate all official subsidy in favor of a national shipbuilding 
industry. 
Some maritime regulations address social issues. As for international instruments, the 
most important bodies are the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) at 
professional level and the International Labor Organization (ILO) at governmental 
 
8
 This principle requires that illegal cargo protection should be prohibited. Members to WTO must 
make sure that their laws, rules and regulations are transparent, their markets are open and all trade 
barriers, tangible or intangible, are removed. Open market policies must be promoted with 
development and economic reforms encouraged. Thus, a foreseeable and constantly expanded market 
entry can be expected (Chang et al., 2008, p.8). 
9
 It is one of the WTO principles that requires fair treatment between foreign companies and national 
ones (Chang et al., 2008, p.8). 
10
 It allows for no discrimination between foreign companies. All the members to WTO are given 
equal most favored nation status and national treatment. Fair competition is to be guaranteed (Chang 
et al., 2008, p.8). 
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level. ITF’s greatest concern is maritime transport although it deals with all the modes 
of transport. It objects to “flag of convenience” and promotes the remuneration 
scheme for the minimum salary of seafarers. ILO is involved in setting standards for 
workers’ decent working condition. The best example of its regulations is the Maritime 
Labor Convention (2006) (MLC) which sets a number of standards on seafarers’ 
contract, minimum age, recruitment and placement, wages, rest hours, repatriation, 
entitlement to leave, manning level, etc. 
All these above rules and regulations cover a broad spectrum of safety, security, 
environmental protection, efficiency and effectiveness. In particular IMO’s technical 
regulations not only apply safety principles but also reflect the industry’s views as 
these regulations are the standards of the industry itself. Therefore, such regulations 
should be developed on the basis of the proper balance between safety and benefit 
goals. If there are too many regulations without reflecting the actual requirements of 
the industry, they will hinder sustainable shipping.  
In fact, no shipping, no maritime regulations. There is no considering maritime safety 
concept without sustainable shipping. If the regulations are seen by the industry as 
unnecessary burden on the shipping, there is no need for governments to meet in IMO 
forums, for they have obligations to protect their national economy’s interest. In any 
case, phenomena arise only when substance exists. 
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CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS TO PRIVATE INTERESTS’ ROLE IN IMO 
The easiest solution to the problem raised by TI in respect of conflicts of interests may 
be that the maritime players should be separated from the maritime judges at IMO 
meetings and be given little access to IMO policy-making to ensure transparent and 
fair policies. As mentioned above, however, complex sciotechnical factors including 
efficiency as well as safety are entangled with each other in shipping. It is not so 
simple to segregate players from judges in the maritime forums unlike in the sports 
playgrounds. Is interference of commercial entities in the maritime policy-making so 
undesirable for maritime development indeed? In order to answer this question, it is 
needed to look into the role that the industry players play in IMO forum. 
3.1  Advantages in private interests’ contribution 
The Convention on the International Maritime Organization (1948) (IMO Convention), 
in Article 1, reads inter alia as follows: 
“The purposes of the Organization are: 
(a) to provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of 
governmental regulations and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds 
affecting shipping engaged in international trade, and to encourage the general 
adopting of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime 
safety and efficiency of navigation; ” 
The above provision clearly stipulates that safety is the priority of IMO’s work. But 
this safety has no meaning unless it is in good balance with cost-effectiveness. And 
this balance comes from the active participation of private interest groups in the IMO 
policy-making. 
In IMO forums, quite a few examples can be found in which commercial groups 
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contribute to establishment of effective mechanisms. In August 2016, for example, the 
ship owners and operators’ group including BIMCO, ICS, the International 
Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), the International 
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) and the World Shipping 
Council (WSC) submitted document MEPC 70/7/8, suggesting that MEPC should 
develop a roadmap to determine a possible IMO fair share contribution to GHG 
reduction in accordance with the Paris Agreement. In the previous year, ICS had 
proposed that IMO should develop an Intended IMO Determined Contribution on 
GHG reduction for the international shipping sector as a whole, taking account of the 
language used in the Paris Agreement to describe contributions that governments will 
make in the form of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). This 
suggestion preluded resolution MEPC.304(72) which was a demonstration of IMO’s 
substantial commitment to UN’s SDG on climate change. The resolution also clarifies 
maritime sector’s sincere efforts for fair share in the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement as against the serious fact that many parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) had handed in INDCs which 
announced that their national economies are currently unable to commit to absolute 
CO2 reductions in the immediate future due to their population increase projections 
and their legitimate desire for sustainable economic development. The above valuable 
suggestion which contributed to the birth of the initial GHG reduction strategy was 
likely to be come up with only by such on-the-spot players as ICS or BIMCO which 
have specific capability of giving a keen insight into the strange relations between the 
ideal and reality.  
TI’s report in question, noting that IMO announced the initial strategy for GHG 
emission reduction, states as follows: 
The announcement was widely welcomed and will trigger some immediate 
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decarbonisation measures. However, a revised, final strategy will not be adopted 
until 2023 and the next five years will see the IMO’s Member States enter 
politically charged and technically complex negotiations to agree a final GHG 
deal.  
The above statement may sound like one-sided comments without taking account of 
the practicability of the GHG emission reduction. Neither UN’s SDG on climate 
change nor the Paris Agreement’s target can be achieved without full preparation 
including data collection and analysis. Therefore, the Working Group on Reduction of 
GHG emissions from ships, organized at MEPC 70, acknowledged that the IMO’s 
strategy for GHG emission reduction would build on the various measures that have 
already been adopted and implemented by IMO member States in relation to the 
reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping including EEDI and SEEMP 
in force since 2013, the immediate determination of the data collection system and 
various technical cooperation activities and major projects. In this context, the 
Working Group agreed that a Fourth IMO GHG study should be carried out to include 
data covering the period from 2012 to 2018, thus bridging the gap between the Third 
IMO GHG Study and the data collection system (IMO, MEPC 70/WP.7). IMO had 
already made public the Third IMO GHG Study 2014 in July 2014 including the GHG 
emission related data from 2007-2012 as presented in Figure 3. If the overall data 
covering the period from 2013 to 2018 is collected and compared with the Third IMO 
GHG Study data, a comprehensive picture will be provided to clarify how effectively 
the post-2013 anti-GHG measures of IMO worked and what steps should be further 
taken to ensure that IMO’s fair share is not only good-looking but also tangible. 
 22 
 
Figure 3. CO2 emissions by ship type (international shipping only) for all years 
2007-2012 
Source: IMO (2014). MEPC 67/INF.3, p.20 
Any of goals for maritime safety and marine environmental protection should be 
realistic, practical and achievable. As shipping is, so far, the most energy efficient 
mode of transport, unrealistic contribution to reducing the shipping sector’s absolute 
CO2 emissions could result in a shift to less energy efficient transport modes. This 
would clearly be counterproductive to reduction of the world’s total CO2 inventory and 
the achievement of INDCs (MEPC 70/7/8, p.2). The revised strategy’s putting off until 
2023 results from the inevitability of sufficient period for the scientific and economic 
research project, rather than IMO member States’ lack of accountability or conflicts of 
interests.  
Industry groups’ contributions to IMO are also visible in other areas including safety, 
security, etc. BIMCO, for example, has been very active in IMO’s work and sponsored 
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or co-sponsored submissions on a number of topical issues including air emissions, 
ballast water, life saving devices, human response to piracy, stability code, Electronic 




ICS’s devotion to IMO’s work is also notable. As the principal global trade association 
for shipowners whose combined merchant fleet accounts for 80% of the world gross 
tonnage, it is concerned with all regulatory, operational and legal issues, as well as 
employment affairs. It attends all IMO meetings, except TC meetings and submits a 
number of proposals aiming at improvement of IMO mechanisms. It participated in 
over 18 working/draft groups and over fifteen correspondence groups, as of March 
2015, with contribution to improvement of IMO instruments (IMO, 2015)
11
. Prior the 
critical adoption of the initial strategy of GHG emission reduction by IMO in April 
2018, ICS played an important role in persuading governments to develop this 
ambitious response to the Paris Agreement. ICS’s proposal in document MEPC 70/7/8 
which was submitted to IMO, just a few weeks after the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, encouraged the industry to submit various detailed proposals to IMO on 
GHG emission reduction during 2017 (ICS, 2018, p.10-11). That is why the above 
analysis points out that ICS’s MEPC 70/7/8 proved a prelude to resolution 
MEPC.304(72).  
All these contributions were clearly supported by the private interest groups’ sufficient 
expertise and experience gained from the reality. Some member States include private 
company employees into their national delegations to IMO meetings probably because 
they believe that they are likely to provide governmental officials with helpful 
information about what is going on in the reality. 
As a matter of fact, IMO’s history is regarded as a story about its painstaking efforts 
 
11  Further information is given in the IMO website: https://docs.imo.org/Category.aspx?cid=746 
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not only to promote maritime safety but also to protect the shipping industry’s interest. 
It is easily illustrated by the components of the IMO treaties as shown in Figure 4. For 
example, some treaties such as liability conventions highlight protection of the 
shipowners’ interest. In this context, the active participation by private interest groups 
in IMO policy-making processes is considered inevitable.  
Figure 4. Categories of IMO treaties 
Source: Author complied from Proshanto. K. Mucherjee (2018). International maritime law, 
legal systems & conventions. Class handout, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, 
China. 
Du (2018) classifies IMO’s legal framework relating to environment issues into three 
categories including pollution prevention, preparedness and response and liability and 
compensation. Under the liability and compensation mechanism, IMO adopted the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1992), the 
International Convention for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage and 
Supplementary Fund and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker 
Oil Pollution Damage all of which purport to ensure shipowners’ interest.  
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In general, the doctrine of restitutio in integrum is predominant, particularly, with 
respect to environmental pollution, regardless of proof of tort. However, this doesn’t 
apply to the maritime sector at the same degree as the other sectors because of the 
above liability conventions of IMO which aim to maintain the sustainable growth of 
the shipping industry. This example clearly illustrates that one of IMO’s greatest 
concern is to provide the maritime legal framework which protect the interest of the 
industry. 
3.2 Disadvantages in private interests’ involvement 
Then, have the private interest groups made only perfect contributions to maritime 
safety promotion and marine environmental protection so far? Unfortunately, answers 
which are frequently heard indicate “No”. As a matter of fact, TI’s concerns about 
what is happening in IMO have much in common with those of the public which has so 
often seen the conflicts of interests in IMO forums. If a keener insight is given to what 
the industry personnel are doing in IMO forums, serious problems are looming. 
3.2.1 Private interest in the GHG reduction  
TI’s report expresses concerns about the private companies’ involvement in IMO 
policy-making because they are likely to resist the adoption of new safety or 
environmental protection measures if they judge those measures to be costly. When 
discussion was made to decide the quantitative target on GHG emission reduction in  
the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, 
Kiribati et al. proposed zero GHG emission by 2035, Belgium et al. proposed 90% 
efficiency improvement and 70% volume reduction, pursuing efforts to 100% 
reduction by 2050, ICS et al. proposed maintaining emission volumes below the 2008 
level and 50% efficiency improvement by 2050 and Japan proposed 40% efficiency 
improvement by 2030 and 50% volume reduction by 2060 (IMO, MEPC 72/7/3). As 
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shown in Figure 5, the scenarios of ICS and Japan are less ambitious than the others. 
 
Figure 5. CO2 emissions scenarios proposed by some States 
Source: IMO (2018). MEPC 72/7/3, p.2 
Japan brought forward its proposal at MEPC 72 as well. Noting that analysis of 
UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2017 shows the energy efficiency 
improvement by 30% in global shipping in 2015 compared to the 2008 level, Japan 
considered that speed reduction resulting from excess fleet and market restraint 
following the financial crisis accounts for the majority of such efficiency 
improvement by 2015. This analysis indicates that such market effect is temporary 
and, thus, the energy efficiency will not remain at the 2015 level in the future without 
any further policy measures. Based on this diagnosis, Japan proposed 50% volume 
reduction by 2060 as presented in Table 8. Nevertheless, MEPC 72 adopted the 




Table 8. Efficiency improvement estimated by Japan 
Source: IMO (2018). MEPC 72/7/3, p.3 
Japan’s intention was less ambitious than that of the adopted strategy as well as other 
States’ proposals. It is true that Japan justified its proposal in a scientific and accurate 
way. However, a question is raised whether its proposal had been influenced by the 
private interests who feared long-term investment into GHG emission reduction, as 
against the fact that 5 among Japanese delegates at MEPC 72 came from the Japaneses 
Shipowners’ Association (IMO, MEPC 72/INF.1, p.22). 
3.2.2 Undesirable impact of private interests on IMO’s work as a whole 
It may be quite reckless to jump with the above example alone to the hasty conclusion 
that private interest negatively impacts on IMO’s decision-making. If, however, more 
undivided attention is paid to what is happening in broader parts of maritime sector 
including the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and the other committees of IMO, it 
will become clear that there is no denying the serious consequences produced by the 
commercial agencies’ over-interference in IMO’s rule-making.  
Aiming at zero casualty 
IMO, in order to realize its teleology, adopted a number of instruments including 
conventions, codes, guidelines, etc. Almost all of those instruments were deeply 
related to marine casualties. Safety, and sometimes even environmental protection, is 
briefly regarded as being free from accidents. Thus, the public opinion is considered to 
be “the fewer accidents, the safer, cleaner and more efficient oceans.” In this regard, 
IMO’s work was, is and will be focused on minimizing and finally eliminating marine 
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casualties. In order to realize the dream of zero casualty, IMO adopted significant 
anti-accident measures whenever it witnessed a serious marine disaster. It is 
well-known that the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974) 
(SOLAS), IMO’s most important safety instrument, was derived from its 1914 version 
which was born as a collection of the lessons drawn from the Titanic Disaster while 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1973) 
(MARPOL), IMO’s most significant environmental protection instrument, was 
adopted following the Torrey Canyon Disaster.  
 
Figure 6. Average number of major oil spills per year (over 700 tonnes) 
Source: Du Dachang (2018). Marine Environment Protection Standards. Class handout, 
Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China 
Then, are these instruments really effective in the fulfillment of IMO’s mission and 
vision? To answer this question, many studies were made of the efficacy of IMO 
instruments some of which proved satisfactory. For example, the average yearly 
number of oil spill incidents which used to be reportedly 25.2 in the 1970s reduced to 
3.1 in the 2000s as shown in Figure 6 (Du, 2018, p.13). The amount of spilled oil also 
witnessed considerable decrease during the MARPOL implemented period as shown 
in Figure 7. The public believe that MARPOL is credited with contributing to the 
substantial decrease of oil pollution accidents. Recently MARPOL Annex VI’s 
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efficacy is considered substantial. In 2015, for instance, the CO2 emission from the 
global shipping reduced by 8% compared with 2008 level, in spite of a 30% increase in 
maritime trade (ICS, 2018, p.8).  
 
Figure 7. Oil spillage from 1970 to 2015 including tanker accidents 
Source: Du Dachang (2018). Marine Environment Protection Standards. Class handout, 
Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China 
Shipping losses also shows the continuously declining trend as shown in Figure 8. In 
particular, 2018 saw more than 50% reduction year-on-year from 98 to 46 in terms of 
frequency (AGCS, 2019)
12
. It is out of question that these achievements are 
inconceivable without IMO’s safety instruments including SOLAS and its associated 
codes and guidelines. However, serious problems are found to be hidden between the 
lines of those instruments if more detailed analysis is given to how they are born by, 
and going with the industry. 
 
12 Further information is given in the AGCS website: 
https://www.agcs.allianz.com/news-and-insights/reports/shipping-safety.html 
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Figure 8. Declining trend in shipping losses from 2008 to 2017 
Source: AGCS (2018). Safety and Shipping Review 2018. Munich, Germany: Author. 
ISM Code－a powerful tool for safety or just piece of paper for formality? 
Bhattacharya (2012), after studying the effectiveness of the International 
Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (the 
ISM Code), concluded that there is a considerable difference between the stances of 
managers and seafarers in the implementation of the ISM Code and as such a wide 
gap between the expected outcome of the Code implementation and the practice. 
Attributing the existing shortcomings of the ISM Code to non-participation of 
seafarers in safety policy making which is traced back to their short-term contracts 
with their companies, he recommended to consider ways of improving underlying 
socioeconomic conditions of seafarers which could be the first step towards breaking 
the vicious circle of little trust, blame and scepticism between employers and 
employees. His assessment of the ISM Code and subsequent recommendations are 
worthy of in-depth consideration. Indeed, the ISM Code is considered one of the best 
examples which illustrate the side-effect of private interests’ involvement in the IMO 
rule-making process. 
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The adoption of the ISM Code was traced back to document MSC 46/18/7 submitted 
in the early 1980s by private interest groups such as ICS, INTERTANKO, etc. which 
attributed the frequent marine casualties to poor safety management system (SMS). 
In this context, ICS et al. developed a voluntary guideline, Code of Good 
Management Practice in Safe Ship Operation and subsequently the UK Department 
of Transport brought out a guidance titled Good Ship Management for the 
UK-flagged ships. Both of these were the precursory instruments to the ISM Code 
which came up with the idea of self-regulation (Bhattacharya, 2009, pp.29-32).  
Throughout the 1980s IMO witnessed continuous discussions on self-regulation at its 
meetings and, finally, in 1987, saw the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in which 
188 lives were lost in the English Channel. As it was a UK-flagged passenger ferry, 
Her Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO) investigated the casualty and produced a 
report with damning evidences which blamed the ferry company’s management for 
the disaster. It stated that “the Board of Directors did not appreciate their 
responsibility for the safe management of their ships” and put a stress on their 
repeated failures in providing adequate support to their ships’ masters for operational 
safety (HMSO, 1987, p. 14). The HMSO report speeded up the drafting of a new 
IMO instrument which aimed at SMS improvement of shipping companies. Further, 
the social pressure from the outside world such as insurance companies urged IMO 
to take tangible actions to prevent the frequently occurring marine accidents. Finally, 
IMO adopted the ISM Code by its Assembly resolution A.741(18) in November 17, 
1993. The Code required managers to assume greater responsibilities for their 
companies’ SMS. Heretofore, ship inspectors from the maritime authorities had been 
required to ensure statutory compliance mainly through inspections. But the ISM 
Code showed a shift from the earlier control mechanism to the self-checking and 
self-regulating based system. It required management to monitor their ships and 
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report to their flag State thereabout. This was a meaningful step towards establishing 
the link between the flag State authority, the ship operator and the ship. IMO, greatly 
hopeful of the ISM Code’s contribution to the global maritime safety and marine 
environmental protection, made the Code mandatory in 1998 by introducing a new 
chapter IX into SOLAS. 
However, it was widely argued across the industry, from the beginning, that the 
expected improvement had not been enjoyed since the ISM Code was implemented. 
In 2001, for example, an international study used more than 3,000 survey 
questionnaires to analyze opinions of seafarers and shore-based stakeholders on the 
usefulness of the ISM Code and found out that seafarers were more dismissive of the 
values of the Code than their managers (Anderson, 2002). Another study showed that 
80% of shipping companies regarded the Code merely as a piece of paper licensing 
to run their business. It pointed out that managers failed to see the safety goals as 
long-term economic benefits and, therefore, did not see the need to provide sufficient 
resources for shipboard safety (Lloyd, 2003).    
In this context, IMO conducted another study between 2004 and 2005 by using 
questionnaires as well. IMO Secretary General established a group of independent 
experts selected from administrations, organizations, academia and the shipping 
industry and tasked it to analyse the impact of the ISM Code. The group, after 
finishing their work, submitted to MSC 81 document MSC 81/17/1 reporting that 
about 99% of the 3,109 respondents who received questionnaires were supportive of 
the ISM Code. However, the group regarded this positive result questionable and 
acknowledged that this was because, due to the methodological shortcomings, the 
majority of the respondents came from those who had generally enjoyed some 
benefit from the implementation of the ISM Code (MSC 81/17/1).  
Conflicts of interests adumbrated in the ISM Code 
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Taking into account the lessons drawn from the above methodology applied by IMO, 
another study was conducted of two shipping companies between 2006 and 2009. 
Both were European based with good reputations. 20 managerial officials and 67 
seafarers from the two companies were interviewed and voyages of different flagged 
ships were researched into for 49 days. The study revealed that there was a yawning 
gap in the perceptions between the managers and seafarers. While interviewees from 
the both managements claimed that their SMSs were robust with adequate resources 
for supporting their seafaring colleagues, the interviewed seafarers regarded their 
SMS helpless. They complained that all the information in the documented 
instructions and procedures are merely generic and not ship-specific. They were also 
critical about too much obsession with paperwork. The most serious eye-catcher in 
the study outcomes was that the managements attributed the most common cause for 
marine accidents to seafarers’ non-compliance although the incident reporting 
policies in both the companies recognized the importance of the no-blame culture. 
This led to seafarers’ fear of being blamed for shipboard incidents and losing jobs 
which resulted in nonfulfillment of the reporting procedures. The study revealed a 
number of serious findings in the huge discrepancy between what the ISM Code 
seeks for and what is happening in the practice (Bhattacharya, 2012).  
Reviewing the results of all the damning reports of the ISM Code studies, Baumler 
(2018) indicates that the ISM Code’s impacts on seafarers are featured by, inter alia, 
exclusion of seafarers from their own safety management, crew abilities and pride 
downgraded, forced engagement of seafarers to comply with their companies’ agenda, 
permanent threat by audit and control, fear in reporting, job insecurity, loss of 
autonomy and control on work organization and impair motivation of senior officers 
and rest of staff. His statement constitutes accurate assessment. The cause for these 
serious problems was attempted to be found in the composition of the ISM Code 
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itself. It was argued that the Code appeared to limit the role of seafarers to blindly 
following the procedural requirement enforced by the managers. The Code does not 
refer to the need for involving seafarers in the companies’ decision making process. 
It, for example, does not mention the importance of involving seafarers in the risk 
assessment process. The lack of seafarers’ input in the organizations’ risk assessment 
is also reflected by the popularity of the use of commonplace SMSs in the maritime 
industry. On several occasions the industry press stated that shipowners could buy 
readily available generic SMSs for immediate implementation. Such SMSs are 
generally produced by commercial entities which come up with standard 
ship-operating policies and procedures along with non-specific checklists and forms 
that fit a wide variety of maritime organizations and trades. They do not take into 
account the specific requirements of the organizations or the ships or acknowledge 
the importance of the seafarers’ views in the decision making process. Thus, 
seafarers are provided with few opportunity to promoting their competence, training 
and motivation. Furthermore, they have little support from trade unions at the 
workplace (Bhattacharya, 2009, pp.52-53). 
Despite the above, no appropriate action has been taken so far. As shown in Table 9, 
IMO amended the ISM Code on several occasions but failed to revise it in 
compliance with the actual requirements of the practice. Rather, the amendments to 
the Code resulted in intensifying the absolute role of the management while ignoring 
seafarers’ participation in safety policy-making. For example, MSC resolution 
MSC.273(85), overestimated the managers’ responsibility for risk identification by 
amending paragraph 1.2.2.2 of the Code, for shipboard operations by amending 
section 7, for establishing procedures to respond to the potential emergency 
shipboard situations by amending paragraph 8.1 and for internal audits on board and 
ashore by amending paragraph 12.1 but never addressed the essential problems 
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Table 9. History of the amendment to the ISM Code 
Source: IMO (3 December 2008). International Management Code for the Safe Operation of 
Ships and for Pollution Prevention. adopted by IMO MSC (MSC 273(85)). London: 
Author. 
The above phenomenon adumbrates a picture of the conflicts of interests in IMO. 
Shipping is typical of complex sociotechnical systems. Any consideration, therefore, 
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require not only an analytic but also synthetic look at all the factors in shipping from 
machines to humans, from independence to dependence and from hierarchy to 
network. Every element in the shipping system seems to be distinctive with its own 
clear bounds but, in fact, is interrelated and interacts. When looking into any system, 
it is important to fully consider the three key elements including humans, equipment 
and organization. Humans briefly include employers and employees while equipment 
indicates machines, facilities, installations and other necessary hardware. These two 
elements constitute resources of the system. However, it is not enough to put an 
emphasis on these two elements alone, because the system is able to make up only 
with the realization of the interrelations between humans, between equipment and 
between humans and equipment. Thus, proper attention should be paid to this 
important concept－organization. The system’s important components and their 
relations are illustrated in the SHELL model as shown in Figure 9. In the model the 
most worthwhile to consider is the link between livewares i.e.the relations between 
employers and employees. Employers should fully demonstrate their commitment by 
providing the employees with sufficient resources including decent working and 
living conditions and with sufficient opportunities to participate in the companies’ 
policy making. However, in the practice the employers’ behavior is so often far from 
the ideal. The above analysis of the ISM Code implementation shows that managers 
tend to assume that they have right to all-the-decision-making of their organizations, 
regarding their seafarers as just human machines who have only obligations to 
adhere to those decisions. When considering safety, shore-based managers assumes a 
neighbor stance while seafarers takes a user stance. Therefore, the user friendliness 
of the system cannot be ensured unless seafarers fully participate in SMS policy 




13 Paragraph 5.2 of the Code provides that the company should establish in the SMS that the master 
has the overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and 
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but this authority is confined to onboard decision making. In the current situation, 
both of the managers and seafarers have no alternative but to suffer from the 
burdensome formalistic paperwork. In Bhattacharya (2012, p.4)’s study, it was found 
that, as ships remained out of the ship managers’ reach for most of the time, the 
management lacked the scope to conduct physical surveillance which is why they 
were uncertain about the practice followed on the ships. It implies why SMS is being 
implemented through bureaucracy. 
 
Figure 9. SHELL model 
Source: Raphael Baumler (2018). Human factors in maritime safety and environment 
protection. Class handout, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China. 
All these serious problems inherent in the ISM Code are traced back to how the Code 
was proposed and adopted. When the world witnessed seriously frequent marine 
accidents in the 1980s and the 1990s and, therefore, the social pressure urged the 
                                                                                                                                                             
pollution prevention and request the company’s assistance if necessary. Further, this provision clarifies 
that the master’s authority should be contained in the onboard SMS. 
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maritime sector to take appropriate actions, the shipping industry invented a cheap 
solution which was made of some pieces of paper that is the ISM Code
14
. The Code 
endows managers with a great right to control on SMS as well as their seafarers 
while it forces the unilateral obligation on seafarers to mechanically adhere to their 
managers’ instructions. This is based on the stereotyped idea that managers are 
always clever and seafarers are always stupid. If the Code is read between the lines, 
the bureaucratic perception is looming that all the marine disasters are attributable to 
seafarers’ misdoings and, thus, the companies should reinforce their control over 
their employees. 
 
Figure 10. Three types of preventive measures 
Source: Raphael Baumler (2018). Human factors in maritime safety and environment 
protection. Class handout, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China. 
 
14 This solution is illustrated in Figure 10. Among the three pictures presented, the first one is the 
cheapest preventive measures alluding to the ISM Code. The improvement in equipment alluded to by 
the second picture is considered the most effective but causes additional cost while regulating 
circumstances as illustrated in the third picture may have a negative impact on the companies’ earning. 
Thus, the cheapest and easiest solution seems to control the operators’ behavior, for example, through 
paperwork or over-regulations, just like the ISM Code. 
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Lack of voice from LDCs and SIDSs 
Unbalanced representation exist not only between managements and seafarers but 
also between member States in IMO forums. While private interests from, 
particularly, developed States such as OECD members exercise full representation at 
IMO meetings, either public or private interests from the Least Developed States 
(LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDSs) may suffer from insufficient 
representation due to their budgetary constraints. Such States often lack the means to 
maintain their permanent missions to IMO or to send suitably large delegations. TI 
expressed its concern that this can result in contingent problems of a lack of expertise 
(TI, 2018, p.24).  
Such barriers to full participation are not confined to LDCs or SIDSs. Though the UK 
takes its home team advantage of having the IMO headquarters in its capital, many 
other member States find it hard to send a sufficient number of their representatives, 
perhaps due to financial burdens. For example, while the UK was represented by 15 
civil servants and four private industry representatives at MEPC 71, Barbados, Sierra 
Leone, Tonga and Ukraine, to take four examples among many, had one representative 
each (MEPC 71/INF.1). This often leads to lack of representation in IMO. Because the 
proceedings of committees, sub-committees and working groups take place 
concurrently, IMO meetings need a significant number of staff with relevant technical 
expertise. However many member States fail to be represented effectively across these 
forums as shown in Table 10
15
. It raises another concern that IMO instruments may be 
partially influenced by a small handful of advantageous States.  
 
15
 This table has been developed from the analysis of IMO documents, issued in 2017, including SDC 
5/INF.1, MSC 93/INF.1 and MEPC 71/INF.1. The unbalanced representation is more notable in the 
sub-committees the main function of which is to carry out technical work. It implies that LDCs or 
SIDSs are provided with few opportunities to take part in technical consideration in IMO forums. It is 
perhaps because of their lack of financial budget as well as technical expertise. They appear to attend 
the committees’ meetings by sending a small number of delegations mainly due to their national 




SDC 5 (5)* MSC 93 (3)* MEPC 71 (5)* 
a b c a b c a b c 
Barbados 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 
China 10 15 5 1 18 3 12 20 4 
DPRK 2 2 1 3 4 0 0 2 0 
Japan 13 18 4 8 32 3 11 48 4 
Russia 2 6 3 1 8 3 6 13 4 
Sierra Leon 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Tonga 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 
UK 1 15 3 4 23 3 4 17 3 
Ukraine 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
US 4 11 3 7 20 3 4 16 5 
(...)*: the number of working/drafting groups at each meeting 
a: the number of documents that are submitted 
b: the number of the participants at each meeting 
c: the number of working/drafting groups attended   
Table 10. Representation of exemplary member States in some IMO forums 
Source: Author compiled from IMO (2017).  
Distortion of the spirits of IMO instruments 
The Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety 
Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (CIC) in paragraph 1.1 
stipulates that marine safety investigations do not seek to apportion blame or 
determine liability, emphasizing that its object is to prevent marine casualties and 
marine incidents in the future. But the blame cultures still remains the norm 
throughout the shipping industry. When discussing the issue of the blame culture 
during Bhattacharya’s study, managers always insisted that their companies ran a 
no-blame culture. But the study revealed that the practice is quite different. For 
example, the questions in the reporting forms of both the companies chosen for the 
study were found to focus on identifying seafarer’ flaws. As a result, seafarers felt 
fearful that by reporting incidents they would invite trouble. The interviewed 
seafarers said, if an accident occurs, “Who goes to jail? It’s me.” (Bhattacharya, 2009, 
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p.195-202). Their fears proved not idle. He (2009) noted that seafarers are relatively 
vulnerable group who are easy to be criticized compared with ashore managers and 
ship surveyors. In 2012, the Seafarers Rights International carried out a survey of 
3,480 seafarers of 68 nationalities to look into the criminalization of seafarers. In the 
survey 24% of masters and 8% of seafarers said that they had been faced with 
criminal charges. The interviews with them indicated that serious problems really 
exist although the criminalization is not so rampant. The interviews found that 91% 
of seafarers were not provided with interpretation services, 90% did not have legal 
presentation, 88% had no legal right to explanation, 80% felt intimidated or 
threatened, 81% considered themselves to be treated unfairly and 85% were 
concerned about criminalization (ITF, 2015)
16
. 
It is true that it is an important function of a sovereign State to punish criminals. 
Such an enforcement system contributes to effective implementation of IMO 
instruments as well. The IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code) in 
paragraph 21.6 provides that flag States should take all necessary measures to secure 
observance of IMO instruments by ships, entities and persons under their jurisdiction 
by providing, in national legislation, for penalties of adequate severity to discourage 
violations of international instruments by individuals with certificates under their 
authority and by instituting proceedings－after an investigation has been conducted
－against such individuals who violated international rules and standards. But in 
practise these requirements are applied on an impartial basis. 
The traditional blame culture is based on the belief that systems are safe and, 
therefore, any accident results from human errors. However, within complex 
sociotechnical systems human errors do not originate from individuals but are 
 
16 Further information is given in the SRI website: 
http://seafarersrights.org/seafarers-subjects/fair-treatment/ 
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symptoms of the ever present latent conditions inherent in the complexity of 
organizational factors. For example, the surprising fact that ships carry more than 
90% of global trade with seafarers onboard who account for only 2% of transport 
workers apparently provides a picture of the high efficiency of shipping 
(Schröder-Hinrichs, 2019). The general public, however, frequently fail to look into 
its hidden meaning－ fatigue. A number of marine accidents are considered 
attributable to seafarers’ fatigue which is again attributable to their organizations’ 
working systems. 
Figure 11. Reason’s model 
Source: FAO (2001). Safety at sea as an integral part of fisheries management. Rome: 
Author. 
The relations between these factors and accidents are properly illustrated by Reason’s 
accident causation model. As shown in Figure 11, Reason (1990)’s model 
recommends that accident investigators look into latent failures which are invisible 
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but very significant. In the model, the first layer represents defensive measures that 
are designed to mitigate the unsafe acts. The second and third layers indicate the 
unsafe acts and their relevant preconditions. The fourth layer stands for line 
management deficiencies such as insufficient training, improper maintenance, etc. 
The fifth includes errors of all high-level rule-makers such as regulators, designers, 
manufacturers, employers, etc (FAO, 2001, p.4). His model starts with organizational 
factors including decision-making and generic organizational processes. In this 
regard, marine safety investigations require delving into the basic organizational 
policies (such as strategy, rules and regulations and working culture) and processes 
(such as designing, constructing, operating, maintaining, communicating, manning, 
training and managing) of shipping that make up maritime organizational factors 
containing latent conditions most likely to pose a threat against the system’s safety 
(US Department of Energy, 2012, p.1-2). 
IMO, recognizing the importance of consideration on organizational factors, made 
positive attempts at system thinking by adopting the ISM Code and CIC and the 
relevant guidelines. In particular, CIC suggests careful consideration of 
organizational factors, by providing that any marine safety investigation report 
should address causal factors including mechanical, organizational and human 
factors. It, however, provides no specific references to accident causation models 
though it supports Reason’s model implicitly. Furthermore, Reason’s model is 
designed not to establish the investigation framework but to illustrate the generic 
idea about organizational factors’ impact on accidents. Therefore, IMO adopted 
supplementary guidelines to CIC by its resolution, A.1075(28), which provides 
detailed areas of human and organizational factors to be inquired during 
investigations. However, the mechanism recommended in these guidelines applies 
the stopping rule too early to delve into the latent organizational factors hidden in the 
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top rule-makers and decision-makers, as illustrated in figure 12.  
 
Figure 12. Diagram, recommended by IMO, illustrating how a sequence of events 
leads to a casualty occurrence  
Source: IMO (2014). Guidelines to Assist Investigators in the Implementation of the 
Casualty Investigation Code (Resolution MSC.255(84)): adopted by IMO Assembly 
(A 28/Res.1075). London: Author. 
Safety casualty investigation seeks understanding the organizational, cultural or 
technical factors that, if left unattended, could cause recurrence. In other words, it is 
meant to carefully examine “what” in the organizational system failed and “why” the 
organization allowed itself to degrade to the state that resulted in an undesired 
consequence, as illustrated in Figure 13. It is not so easy to disclose exact 
contributing factors to accidents in the complex shipping system. Resources are 
always limited and safety is only one of many competing priorities. Investigators, 
therefore, should target the latent conditions most in need of urgent attention and 
make them visible to those who manage the system so they can be corrected. 
However, a number of marine accident reports fail to fully consider the 
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organizational factors. A study, for example, reviewed 41 accident investigation 
reports and made a comment that more organizational factors could have been 
identified and that many investigators employed the stopping rule to too early a stage 
of their investigation (Schröder-Hinrichs, 2011). 
Figure 13. Factors contributing to organizational drift 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy (2012). Accident and Occupational Safety Analysis (Vol. 
I). Washington, D.C., US: Author. 
After analyzing the seafarer’ sufferings from burdensome paperwork, Bhattacharya 
(2012) stated on the distortion of the ISM Code’s aims as follows: 
The purpose of the ISM Code, which was meant to offer the necessary support to 
ship captains to ensure a safe operation of ships and continuously improve safety 
management skills did not appear to be the objective in practice. Clearly the 
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managers complied with the Code to the letter and not to its spirit. In the process 
they faced major resistance from seafarers who considered this approach 
inadequate. Managers however interpreted it as seafarers’ apathy and deviance. 
Their emphasis on training and rectifying seafarers’ behaviour are examples of 
such interpretation. Yet, seafarers did not openly oppose the top-down 
implementation of the SMS. 
Given the above, the irony is that, if the top-down approach of the ISM Code is 
applied to marine accident investigations, all the accidents should be attributable to 
the managers who develop all the safety policies, but the reality so often see the 
bottom-up tendency when it comes to blame. This is considered due to fact that ISM 
Code, only taking managers’ interest into account, suggests the stereotypical idea that 




CHAPTER 4. SEEKING FOR THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN 
SAFETY AND BENEFIT 
The above chapter gave consideration to both the merits and demerits of maritime 
players in IMO’s work. This chapter attempts to grope for the effective way of 
minimizing the players’ demerits while maximizing the merits of both the judges and 
players. 
4.1 Anticipated disadvantages in case of absence of maritime players in IMO 
forums 
Over-regulations or under-regulations? 
Regulations can be frequently regarded as burden to the shipping activities. Safety or 
environmental protection measures usually cause additional cost which should be 
borne by the industry. Regulators, however, develop and enforce them because they 
believe that those measures are in the general interest of the maritime sector. But the 
industry, so often considering them to be in little need, takes a reluctant attitude 
towards them. That is why few maritime regulations have ever been smoothly 
implemented in a straightforward manner. Maritime regulation requires ample 
expertise and experience of the broad sector from maritime technology and 
shipbuilding to economics and international trade. The lack of these expertise and 
experience may cause chaotic situations of both over-regulation and under-regulation 
(Ma, 2018, p.143). ICS, anticipating the future of IMO, indicated that many of the 
IMO meetings participants are now officials from environment ministries rather than 
transport officials with specialist technical knowledge of shipping (ICS, 2018, p.28). 
It shows an implicit concern about the evolving vacuum at IMO meetings which can 
be filled only by knowledgeable groups.  
The other eye-catcher is that too strict safety regulations have an adverse impact on 
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the resilience, particularly, in complex sociotechnical systems like shipping. In order 
to prove it, a simulated fishing was experimented on. Comparing fatality statistics in 
the fishing industry with those in other occupational categories reveals that fishing is 
one of the most dangerous occupations. The main reason for it is the fact that the 
human being is a terrestrial species. Fishermen are consistently exposed to such 
dangers as slippery platforms and awkward work postures (FAO, 2001. pp.1-5). That 
is why the study decided to conduct experiment where 34 fishing skippers were 
asked to fish in simulated situations. Contrary to the result expected, none of the 
fishing skippers stopped fishing in extremely bad weather condition. Rather, they 
applied various strategies to achieve their fishing goals by skillfully overcoming the 
hostile conditions. The study concluded that, the more risks seafarers take, the more 
skills and experiences they gain to avoid disasters. This conclusion led to a new idea 
as follows: 
Observed Safety = Sm + Sc 
Sm: safety to be managed during performance 
Sc: safety to be achieved thorough constraints 
In the above formula, if Sm increases, Sc decreases, and vise versa (Gaël Morel et al. 
2008). It shows that too rigid a safety system has adverse impact on its adaptive 
capability. 
How to ensure the trade-off between different interests 
As shown above, absence of the interest group which is able to carry out economic 
studies may lead to the undesirable results including either under-regulations or 
over-regulations. Further the trade-off between safety and performance criteria is 
very tough in real complex sciotechnical systems. However, some considerable 
successes are witnessed in the international arena to promote good balance between 
the public and private interests. The best examples include the mechanism of 
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tripartism and social dialogue in ILO. 
As the oldest UN agency, ILO aims at promoting social justice and internationally 
recognized human and labor rights, pursuing its founding mission that social justice 
is essential to universal and lasting peace. Since 1919 ILO brings together 
governments, employers and workers of 187 member States to set labour standards, 
develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and 
men (ILO, 2019)
17
. For example, MLC was developed and adopted based on the 
consultation and consensus of governments, managers and seafarers. It provides 
consolidated standards for seafarers’ decent working conditions through articles, 
regulations and codes. For the purpose of this dissertation, proper attention is called to 
its articles XIII and XIV. 
Article XIII requires that the Special Tripartite Committee established by the 
Governing Body of ILO shall keep the working of MLC under continuous review. 
The Committee is required to be made up of two representatives nominated by the 
government of each member States and the representatives of shipowners and 
seafarers appointed by the Governing Body after consultation with the Joint 
Maritime Commission. Under this unique system, article XIV provides requirements 
that MLC should be amended based on balanced agreement of different interests as 
shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. MLC amendment procedure 
Source:Raphael Baumler (2018). Occupational Safety and Health Standards. Class handout, 
Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China. 
By employing this unique mechanism, ILO strives to ensure effective negotiation, 
consultation and exchange of information between representatives of governments, 
employers and workers in implementing and updating MLC. Because of the 
importance of tripartism, ILO has made the ratification and implementation of the 
Tripartite Consultation Convention (1976) a priority. It is believed that this 
mechanism ensures that employers’ and workers’ representatives have an equal voice 
with those of governments in shaping its policies and programmes (Baumler, 2018, 
pp.11-14). 
4.2 Consideration on IMO’s current mechanism to ensure effective policy 
making processes  
ILO’s unique tripartite structure is very suggestive of the desirable trade-off between 
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public and private interests. If IMO’s policy-making procedures are looked into, the 
most notable is its efforts to ensure a uniform basis in proposing, considering, 
adopting and implementing its instruments. The best example is included in the 
Organization and method of work of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee and their subsidiary bodies (MSC/MEPC 
Guidelines). IMO’s most important instruments including the six mandatory treaties 
are considered, adopted and updated mainly at MSC and MEPC. The above 
Guidelines, therefore, include key information on how IMO makes its decisions. 
IMO member States should submit any safety/security or environment related 
proposal to MSC or MEPC according to the MSC/MEPC Guidelines. Then those 
committees tasked the cognizant sub-committees to consider it to see whether the 
proposals are worthy of being addressed in their agenda. Based on the report of the 
relevant sub-committees, the committees include the proposals into their agenda so 
as to draft, consider, finalize and adopt them, as shown in Figure 15. The 
sub-committees, with no right to accepting any new proposal from member States 
(MSC/MEPC Guidelines, paragraph 4.9), should focus on conducting the technical 
work entrusted to them (MSC/MEPC Guidelines, paragraph 5.9). In fact, MSC and 
MEPC function as policy-making bodies while the sub-committees only play the role 
of technical bodies in IMO rule-making processes. 
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Figure 15. IMO tech rule making process in MSC/MEPC and their subsidiary bodies 
Source: Author 
IMO’s requirements ensuring industry’s participation 
The MSC/MEPC Guidelines ensure industry’s involvement in several provisions. 
First of all, MSC/MEPC, when accepting a proposal for new output of its agenda, 
should consider its cost-effectiveness as well as its possibility of causing 
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administrative burdens to maritime authorities (paragraph 4.15.5). Secondly the 
committees should verify whether adequate industry standards exist or not 
(paragraph 4.15.7).   
When assessing the implication for capacity-building and technical cooperation in 
accordance with resolution A.998(25), the Ad hoc Capacity-building Needs Analysis 
Group (ACAG) is required to consult the industry. Further, the committees may 
request ACAG to prepare a draft description on its work for consideration by the 
member States as well as the industry (Annex 2 to these Guidelines.). The 
identification of the capacity-building implication requires the following questions to 
be fully answered: 
- Would the industry require new and/or enhancement of existing systems?   
 Does capacity exist internationally to develop new systems? 
- Is there a need for additional training of seafarers? 
 Do related and validated training courses exist?  
 Are sufficient simulation training courses available internationally?  
- Will there be a requirement for new equipment?  
 Does manufacturing capacity exist internationally?  
- Is there repair/servicing and/or retrofitting and does maintenance capacity 
exist internationally?  
All the above criteria for assessment, designed to reflect the commercial groups’ 
interest, can be fully met only when the industry players actively participate in the 
consideration. 
The above analysis shows that the MSC/MEPC Guidelines focus on Authorities’ 
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administrative burden as well as industry’s financial burden when considering new 
safety/environmental protection measures. In this context, member Governments 
may take it as granted to include industry officials from private companies into their 
national delegations to IMO meetings. 
IMO’s requirements ensuring NGO’s participation 
ACAG is required to consult NGOs as well, when it works. In the existing IMO’s 
policy-making processes, NGOs’ role can’t be overestimated under the relevant 
IMO’s rules. They exercise their influence over IMO’s policy-making through the 
IMO’s consultative membership scheme. 
IMO grants a consultative status to an NGO in accordance with the Rules and 
Guidelines for Consultative Status of Non-governmental International Organizations 
with the International Maritime Organization (Consultancy Rules) if it can 
reasonably be expected to make a substantial contribution to IMO’s work. Rule 1 of 
these Rules provides the criteria of determining this contribution as follows: 
(a) whether the NGO’s purposes are directly related to that of IMO and fully in 
harmony with the spirit and functions of IMO;  
(b) whether the NGO’s activities have a direct bearing on the main purposes of 
IMO as a whole, or on the work of any of the committees or sub-committees or 
on the matters dealt with in any conventions in respect of which IMO performs 
depositary or other functions;  
(c) whether the NGO has demonstrated that it has considerable expertise as well 
as the capacity to contribute, within its field of competence, to IMO’s work; and  
(d) whether there are any programmes or projects of the NGO which can 
reasonably be considered as demonstrating the relevance of the NGO's work and 
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interests to those of IMO.  
In the above criteria, IMO focuses on the relevance between IMO and NGOs in 
terms of purposes and activities and NGOs’ efficiency in respect of capabilities and 
resources. Once an NGO is granted by IMO with the consultative status, it will be 
endowed with specific privileges including the right to receive the IMO meeting 
plans and resolutions, the right to be represented by an observer at meetings and the 
right to submit documents on items of the agenda of IMO’s organs. Instead, the NGO 
should make a substantial contribution to IMO’s work through its technical expertise 
and inform the IMO Secretary-General of its activities which are likely to be of 
interest to IMO. 
IMO’s Council periodically review the contribution that the NGOs with consultative 
statuses make and report to the Assembly accordingly. If the report indicates that 
changes occur in the nature, purposes or activities of an NGO or that its contribution 
is not so satisfactory, then the Assembly decides the withdrawal of the NGO’s 
consultative status.  
IMO’s limits to private interests’ involvement in the existing mechanism and 
analysis thereof 
As far as IMO is an intergovernmental agency, it aims at ensuring full and fair 
representation of its member governments while it sets some limits to NGO’s 
involvement in its policy-making processes.  
Rule 6 of the Consultancy Rules confers on NGOs the right to submit documents to 
IMO meetings. If the documents include proposals for the inclusion of new outputs, 
they should be co-sponsored by member States in accordance with paragraph 4.11 of 
the MSC/MEPC Guidelines. 
IMO grants its consultant NGOs with the right to attend its meetings but the 
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attendance is confined to specialist consultancy. Rule 7 of the Consultancy Rules 
requires that one observer from each NGO shall be admitted to any meeting. Such 
observer has no voting rights but may speak on any issue in the interest of his/her 
NGO with the approval of the committees or sub-committees. However, this rule is 
not observed in practice. For example, MEPC saw 18 observers from ICS, 7 from 
INTERTANKO, 4 from INTERCARGO, 5 from WSC, etc. (MEPC 72/INF.1) while 
MSC 99 witnessed 14 representatives from ICS, 5 from BIMCO, 4 from 
INTERTANKO, 3 from INTERCARGO, etc. (MSC 99/INF.1) And there was no 
explanation for these exceeding numbers. 
IMO permits no duplication in the contribution of its consultant organizations. The 
Consultancy Rules stipulates in Rule 3 that consultative status should not be granted 
where each of two or more rival organizations purports to represent a particular 
interest to the exclusion of the others. This is the only rule in IMO’s legal framework 
which attempts to prevent conflicts. However, this rule focuses on conflict between 
organizations of similar service, but not the conflicts of interests between public and 
private agencies. For example, when the International Association of Technical 
Survey and Classification Institutions (TSCI) applied to IMO for its consultant status, 
the IMO Council, at its 120
th
 session, decided not to grant such status to it, due to the 
concern that TSCI’s contribution may overlap and, therefore, conflict with that of the 
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) which had already 
provided IMO with its consultant assistance since long ago (C 120/D, p.15). 
The above review shows that IMO has recognized both the importance of the 
consultancy with the industry and the drawbacks of its over-involvement in the 
maritime policy-making and has taken appropriate actions accordingly. The only 
thing that IMO has missed is adequate attention to prevention against conflicts of 
public and private interests in IMO forums. The disproportionate representation of 
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different interests in IMO forums is indicated in the recent IMO documents on the 
lists of participants as illustrated in Table 11. MEPC 71 and MSC 71, the IMO 
forums with hottest topics, witnessed participants from trade associations accounting 
for 53.8%
18
 of all while those from CSOs for 20.7%
18
 only. However, TC 67, mainly 
addressing the topic of technical cooperation for developing States, was attended by 
trade association representatives constituting only 21%
18
 of all. This unbalanced 
representation indicates the partial influence of different interests. It also implies 
what is the greatest concern of private interests in the IMO forums.  
 
Table 11. The number of NGO participants present at recent IMO meetings, grouped 
by interest and activities 
Source: TI (2018). Governance at the International Maritime Organization. The case for 
reform. Berlin: Author. 
Private interest groups are notably active discussers at IMO meetings. At MEPC 71, 
for example, consultative participants submitted 37 documents of which 26 were 
from trade associations while the others from CSOs (MEPC 71/17). Rule 7 of the 
Consultancy Rules allows in principle for all the NGOs’ constructive participation. 
However, the consultative CSOs which represent environmental and climate change 
concerns at committees suffer from limited participation in correspondence groups 
 
18
 Calculated by the author based on the figures listed in Table 11. 
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and working groups elsewhere in IMO, perhaps due to lack of resources (TI, 2018, 
p.25). 
FSA considered as IMO’s most notable existing mechanism to ensure the trade-off 
between public and private interests 
Though IMO is one of the smallest of UN agencies, it is regarded as a model of 
regulatory efficiency having developed a wide range of international treaties 
governing every aspect of maritime affairs. It has a great reputation of having provided 
an example of what can be achieved by governments when they make a serious 
decision through international cooperation (ICS, 2018, p.26). From the outset IMO has 
attempted to ensure effective cooperation between States and between governments 
and industry and, thus, accumulated valuable experience therein. For example, IMO’s 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) mechanism contributes to adoption of safe, secure, 
clean and efficient measures. 
FSA, set forth in MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.2, serves as a structured and systematic 
methodology, aiming to promote maritime safety and protect marine environment by 
using risk analysis and cost-benefit assessment. IMO approved the first version of 
FSA guidelines at MSC 74 in 2001 and consistently updated them to see the latest 
version in 2018. FSA is designed to constitute a tool which may be used in the IMO 
rule-making process. The introduction of FSA to the IMO rule-making process 
represented a fundamental change from what was previously a largely piecemeal and 
reactive regulatory approach to one which is proactive, integrated, and above all 
based on risk evaluation and management in a transparent and justifiable manner 
thereby encouraging greater compliance with the maritime regulatory framework, in 
turn leading to improved safety and environmental protection (Hesse, 2018, p.44). 
According to the FSA guidelines, when any proposal to adopt a new instrument or to 
 59 
amend the existing one is brought forward, its value is required to be demonstrated 
through risk and cost analysis. As shown in Figure 16, FSA comprises five steps 
including hazards identification, risk analysis, risk control option (RCO) 
identification, cost benefit assessment and recommendations for decision-making. 
The FSA process commences with the decision-makers defining the problem to be 
assessed along with any relevant conditions. These are referred to the FSA group 
consisting of subject experts including technical and industry representatives who 
will carry out FSA and submit the results thereof to the decision makers. The group 
members should be suitably qualified and experienced. They analyze the relevant 
risks, propose an RCO accordingly and assess the cost-effectiveness of the RCO. If 
both the risk controlling ability and cost benefit of the RCO are fully demonstrated, 
the decision-makers are to accept it (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.2). 
 
Figure 16. Flow chart of the FSA methodology 
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Source: IMO (2018). Revised Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the 
IMO Rule-making Process (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.2). London: Author. 
FSA has been suitably employed across the IMO forums to contribute to trade-off, 
transparency and efficiency in the IMO rule-making processes. For example, IACS 
identified the hazards concerning general cargo ships, assessed the related risks 
accordingly as shown in Table 12, identified possible 32 RCOs thereabout and 
analyzed their cost-benefits. Following these proceedings, it distinguished acceptable 
RCOs from unacceptable ones. For the purpose of this dissertation, RCOs 2 and 20 
will be taken as examples among them.  
 
Table 12. Casualty statistics and accident frequencies for general cargo ships 
(1997-2008) 
Source: IMO (2010). MSC 88/INF.8, p.9. 
RCO2 on ECDIS integrated with AIS and RADAR was anticipated to contribute to 
reduction of the risk of stranding and collision because it will enable the officer of 
watch to pay attention only to one display without jumping between three displays.  
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As for RCO 20 on port State control (PSC) inspector training on general cargo ships, 
foundering accidents would be able to reduce by 42% (MSC 88/INF.6, p.86). This 
RCO aims at increasing PSC inspectors’ expertise with respect to technical 
inspection on ships. Given its total operating cost for 25 years－US$ 3,125 (MSC 
88/INF.6, p.76), its GCAF was calculated as follows
19
. 
GCAF = (US$ 3,125 ÷ 25 years) / 1.10E-03 ≈ US$ 113,636 
The economic benefit per ship year was estimated US$ 2,431 (MSC 88/INF.6, p.76) 
and, hence, the NCAF was calculated as follows
19
. 
NCAF = (US$ 3,125 ÷ 25 years - US$ 2,431) / 1.10E-03 ≈ US$ -2,096,364 
The calculated GCAF values are used to justify the RCOs for their life saving 
capabilities while the NCAF values are summed up to see the need of regulation of 
the RCOs with economic benefit taken into account. Any RCO is considered 
 
19 Calculated by the author based on the data in IMO documents MSC 88/INF.6 and MSC 88/INF.8. 
20 Provided by IACS in document MSC 88/INF.6 
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acceptable if its GCAF is below US$ 3 million while its NCAF is negative (Skjong, 
2019). As listed in table 13, the above FSA study shows that RCO 20 is a desirable 
solution in respect of risk reduction and economic benefits as against RCO 2. 
Table 13. Summarized results of CBA on RCOs 2 and 20 
Source: Author complied from IMO (2010). MSC 88/INF.8, p.16 and based on the author’s 
own calculations. 
The other RCOs were analyzed likewise. A summary of the results from the above 
FSA study was submitted by IACS in document MSC 88/INF.8 to MSC 88 (MSC 
88/19/2). MSC 88 (MSC 88/26, p.79) and MSC 89 (MSC 89/25, p.73) discussed the 
IACS’s document and agreed to instruct the FSA groups to further consider the 
recommended RCOs 17, 20, 26, 27 and 28. MSC 90, after considering document 
MSC 90/WP.7 containing the report of the GBS/FSA working group, agreed to 
include those recommended RCOs related actions into the relevant sub-committees’ 
biannual agenda (MSC 90/28, pp.78-91).  
As seen above, the FSA methodology is quite suggestive of what the public wants to 
see in the international forum in which complex standards should be established 
through cooperation between several interests. It contains good ideas to make 











RCO 2 CN, WS 75,672 3.75E-04 2,960 8.1E+06 1.8E+05 
RCO 20 FD 3,125 1.10-03 2,431 1.1E+05 -2.1E+06 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Findings 
In the above chapters, the dissertation made an analysis of what is going on in the 
international maritime forums, based on TI’s assessment of IMO’s governance. 
Focusing on the issue of conflicts of interests, it attempted to answer the question 
whether the industry’s involvement really has a negative impact on IMO forums and, if 
so, how to tackle this problem. 
As a regulatory body for shipping, IMO regards the consultation with the industry as 
inevitable. IMO is not a regulator itself but a forum in which its 170 member States can 
engage with one another and agree common global standards and policies. IMO has so 
far functioned as a wonderful forum for shipping regulation. Because it provides all 
the maritime States and interest groups with reasonable opportunities to enjoy the 
achievable harmony in setting complex maritime standards, the maritime world 
underwent the radical betterment which was inconceivable before IMO was born. 
Thanks to IMO’s tireless efforts to promote maritime safety and ensure sound growth 
of shipping, the world community has come to achieve the systematic and 
well-defined maritime legal framework as illustrated in Figure 4 and, therefore, make 
sure that its zero-accident dream will be realized in due course as implied in Figures 6, 
7 and 8. It is out of question that the industry made tangible contributions to these 
achievements through the consultancy scheme of IMO. 
Yet IMO’s work leaves much to be desired as TI’s report indicates. The above analysis 
also shows some undesirable pictures of the IMO decision-making system which are 
quite different from what the public would like to see. For example, the studies on the 
ISM Code offers meaningful hints thereabout. Before seeking an effective way of 
adding better amendments to the ISM Code, the root cause for the relevant problems 
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are to be first identified in the IMO governance system so that appropriate actions 
could be taken for improvement of IMO policy-making processes.  
In this age of development, nothing stands still. Continuous betterment should be 
sought for without stagnation caused by over-conceit on the past achievement. TI’s 
report provides a hint that it is the time for IMO to make a sound judgement whether its 
existing shortcomings are diseases subject to medication or surgery.  
5.2 Recommendations 
In conclusion, it is the name of the game to ensure better balanced representation of 
different interests in IMO forums. This dissertation, recognizing both the great 
achievements and considerable inadequacies of IMO, recommends the following, on 
the basis of the above comprehensive analysis.  
Appointment of member State delegations  
It is invited to establish a uniform set of rules that regulates the nomination of the 
delegations by the IMO member States. These rules are supposed to aim at offering a 
universal standards for the member States to ensure better representation of the public 
interest in IMO forums.  
It is recommended that these rules, inter alia, should provide the IMO member States 
with an appropriate methodology of how they can fully demonstrate the absence of 
conflicts of interests within their national delegations as well as across the IMO 
meetings. Preferably, the rules are recommended to allow for the inclusion of private 
industry officials only into non-Council member States’ delegations. It is considered as 
an acceptable mechanism not only to prevent over-influence of Council member States 
but also to remedy the under-representation of disadvantageous member States 
illustrated in Table 10. 
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If this is the case, some concerns may be raised about vacuum of technical expertise 
and experience to evolve in the forums. IMO, however, can dispel such concerns by 
employing or improving its existing mechanism. The MSC/MEPC Guidelines, 
paragraph 4.6, requires that submissions containing proposals for new outputs must be 
justified with regard to the following aspects, set out in annex 1 to the Guidelines: 
• whether the proposal is within the scope of IMO’s mission; 
• its need in terms of the risks or hazards which are deemed necessary to be 
addressed; 
• its practicability, cost to the maritime industry as well as the relevant 
legislative and administrative burdens; 
• benefits anticipated from its introduction; 
• availability of the relevant industry standards; 
• whether human elements are sufficiently addressed; 
• its urgency; and 
• action required. 
The above requirements are designed to facilitate MSC/MEPC’s assessment of such 
submissions. When the submissions containing the above demonstration are circulated 
throughout the IMO member States before the relevant meetings, the industry is 
provided with full opportunity of pre-meeting consideration of the submissions in 
economic terms. Further, IMO has FSA mechanism in place. Its proceedings shown in 
Figure 16 proved very helpful for demonstrating the practicability, transparency and 
efficiency of newly proposed measures at IMO meetings. IMO’s FSA is considered as 
one of the most effective and efficient mechanisms which aims to ensure the full 
balance between the public and private interests, as analyzed in IACS’s examples 
above. If IMO reinforces and updates all its relevant existing mechanisms in FSA as 
well as in annex 1 to the MSC/MEPC Guidelines, the consultation with the industry 
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will be further improved without physical participation of the industry representatives 
at IMO meetings as IMO’s online document circulation system enables full 
pre-meeting brainstorming. In other words, it is anticipated to contribute not only to 
saving too many industry representatives the physical participation at the meetings but 
also to minimizing the lack of voice of developing States across several IMO forums 
by limiting the over-participation of the industry personnel from influential States. As 
such, it will enable IMO to fully prove its efforts of preventing the over-involvement 
by the industry in its rule-making. 
It is also recommended to consider transferring the headquarters of IMO from the UK 
to a more geographically suitable State. Since the number and roles of the newly 
emerging maritime States are increasing in Asia as implied in Table 7, there is no 
longer a need to hold fast to the traditional European maritime hub. Moreover, the high 
expenses in the UK is considered to cause an uncontrollable burden to LDCs or SIDSs 
in maintaining a permanent mission to IMO. On top of that, the UK is geographically 
far away from most of LDCs or SIDSs, which may constitute one of their 
disadvantages in sending suitably large delegations to IMO meetings. If IMO’s 
headquarters will be transferred to a more geographically and economically 
advantageous place, the operating cost of IMO itself will also be considerably saved, 
which will lead to greater part of its budget allocated to international cooperation. 
Taking this opportunity, IMO is recommended to make a critical decision of its new 
location for its present as well as for its future. 
Besides, IMO is invited to consider forum-specific standards for its member States’ 
delegation appointment system. For example, the Sub-Committee on Human Element, 
Training and Watchkeeping (HTW) addresses human element related issues that 
require the loud voice from seafarers. Thus, it is needed to consider regulating the 
participation of representatives from governments, shipowners and seafarers at HTW 
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meetings. Besides, it is worthy of considering the participation of seafarer 
representatives in other sub-committees when these sub-committees discuss the ship 
design or shipborne equipment which requires ergonomics and user-friendliness. IMO 
is recommended to seek for a effective methodology of encouraging seafarers’ 
involvement in IMO policy-making. 
Balanced participation of CSOs and trade associations in IMO policy-making 
IMO is invited to take appropriate actions to ensure better balanced participation of 
CSOs and trade associations at its meetings.  
The above analysis considers that CSOs are frequently exceeded by trade associations 
at IMO meetings, as shown in Table 11, perhaps mainly due to lack of resources of 
CSOs. As mentioned above, paragraph 4.11 of the MSC/MEPC Guidelines requires 
that submissions from NGOs for the inclusion of new outputs be co-sponsored by 
member States. It is recommended to extend the application scope of this paragraph 
to promotion of the close relationship between CSOs and industry interest groups. 
For example, the existing Consultancy Rules may be amended to require that, when 
an industry group submits any environmental protection related proposal to IMO, it 
should be co-sponsored by an environment related CSO. When a trade association 
submits any human element related proposal, that proposal may be required to be 
co-sponsored by a trade union or seafarers association. These new regulations are 
anticipated to further improve the current consultancy scheme of IMO in terms of 
fairness, transparency and efficiency. 
The principle of “one observer from each NGO” in Rule 7 of the Consultancy Rules 
is required to be reviewed. Why this Rule has been breached so overtly remains a big 
question. Consideration is needed. If Rule 7 is found unreasonable, it should be 
amended accordingly, but if not, appropriate actions should be taken to ensure 
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compliance with it with a view to the desirable balance in representation between 
CSOs and industry organizations. If more than one observer must necessarily 
participate in a meeting, the reasonable ground for it should be provided to the 
relevant committees or sub-committees. 
TI’ report recommendations include the development of the Code of Conduct 
governing the behaviors of delegates of IMO’s member States and even providing for 
sanctions against the breach of the Code. This dissertation would not go so far as to 
comment this sensitive issue, but firmly believe that IMO will bring about a radical 
turn in its work to create the bright maritime future which the public wants to see. 
IMO has so far shown a wonderful model of continuously reviewing its mission and 
vision to achieve and maintaining and improving its overall governance resources 
and processes. This dissertation hopes that such model will be ever-lasting thanks to 
IMO’s tradition of boldly acknowledging and overcoming its demerits and wisely 
valuing and enriching its merits. 
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Appendix 1 Make-up of delegations from some selected IMO member 
States at MEPC 72 and MSC 99 





 Head of Delegation  
 Adm. Sergio Roberto Fernandes dos Santos, Brazilian Permanent Representative 
to IMO, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO  
 Representative  
 H.E. Mr. Hermano Telles Ribeiro, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of 
Brazil to International Organizations in London, Permanent Representation of 
Brazil to International Organizations in London  
 Alternates  
 Capt. Carlos Henrique de Lima Zampieri, Alternate Permanent Representative of 
Brazil to IMO, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO  
 Ms. Ana Paula Simões Silva, Minister Counsellor, Alternate Permanent 
Representative of Brazil to IMO, Permanent Representation of Brazil to 
International Organizations in London  
 Advisers  
 Cdr. André Ricardo Araujo Silva, Mission Officer, Brazilian Permanent 
Representation to IMO  
 R. Adm. Gilberto Santos Kerr, Assistant Coordinator, Coordinating Committee for 
IMO Matters (CCA-IMO), Brazilian Navy  
 Mr. Nilson José Lima, Chief Engineer Officer (Merchant Marine), Mission 
 
21
 Extracted from the data included in MEPC 72/INF.1 and MSC 99/INF.1. 
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Officer, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO  
 Capt. (Rtd.) Alberto Pereira Nogueira, Technical Consultant, Coordinating 
Committee for IMO Matters (CCA-IMO), Brazilian Navy  
 Capt. (Rtd.) Fernando Alberto Gomes da Costa, Technical Consultant, Executive 
Support Unit for the Coordinating Committee for IMO Matters (SEC-IMO), 
Brazilian Navy  
 Ms. Marcia Jorio Villares da Costa, Technical Officer, Brazilian Permanent 
Representation to IMO  
 Mrs. Ellen Mucke, Technical Officer, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO  
 Mr. Heiland Serotiuk Lyrio, Technical Officer, Brazilian Permanent 
Representation to IMO  
 Mr. Marco Antonio Costa Tritto, Bunker, Fuel, Oil, Residuals and Feedstock 
Trading Manager, Brazilian Petroleum Company (PETROBRAS)  
Mr. Luiz de Andrade Filho, Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Mr. Carlos Alberto Carloni, Director, Norsul Shipping Company  
 Mr. Luiz Gylvan Meira Filho, Visiting Researcher, Institute of Advanced Studies, 
University of Sao Paulo - Brazil  
 Mr. Jorge Antonio Lopes, Environmental Consultant, Ministry of Mineral 
Resources and Energy/Brazilian Petroleum Company (PETROBRAS)  
 Mr. Robson Calixto, Manager, Ministry of the Environment  
 Mr. Rodrigo Madeira Bermelho, Naval Engineer, Vale S.A.  
 Mr. Erasto Almeida, External Affairs Manager, Vale S.A.  
 Mr. Péricles Vieira Filho, Master Mariner, Vale S.A.  
 Mr. Rafael Fisher Dutra e Mello dos Santos, Naval Engineer, Vale S.A.  
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CHINA  
 Head of Delegation  
 Representative  
 Mr. Zan Yang, Maritime Counsellor, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 
London  
 Alternates  
 Mr. Xinzhai Yang, Deputy Director General, China Maritime Safety 
Administration  
 Mr. Xiaojie Zhang, Deputy Director General, Department of International 
Cooperation, Ministry of Transport  
 Advisers  
 Mr. Xiaodong Zhang, First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 
London  
 Mr. Tao Li, First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, London  
 Mr. Shibo Li, Engineer, Shanghai Maritime University  
 Mr. Xingsen Chen, Section Chief, International Cooperation  
 Ms. Shuang Zhang, Research Assistant, Dalian Maritime University  
 Mr. Yinglei Zhao, Deputy Director, China Maritime Safety Administration  
 Ms. Huifang Wang, Senior Engineer, China Classification Society (CCS)  
 Mr. Yunzhi Fan, Senior Engineer, China Classification Society (CCS)  
 Mr. Lu Li, Professor, Shanghai Merchant Ship Design and Research Institute  
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 Mr. Lu Li, Senior Engineer, China Classification Society (CCS)  
 Mr. Leyi Dong, Director, China Maritime Safety Administration  
 Mr. Min Xu, Director, Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration  
 Mr. Bo Zhang, Principal Staff, Hebei Maritime Safety Administration  
 Mr. Ji Chen, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company  
 Ms. Yuan Fang, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
 Head of Delegation  
 Mr. Kwang Min Kim, Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to IMO, Embassy of the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, London  
 Representative  
 Mr. Jun Hyok Im, Counsellor, Alternate Permanent Representative of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to IMO, Embassy of the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, London  
INDIA  
 Head of Delegation  
 Representatives  




 Head of Delegation  
 Mr. Jotaro Horiuchi, Minister of Transport, Alternate Permanent Representative 
of Japan to IMO, Embassy of Japan, London  
 Representatives  
 Mr. Hideaki Saito, Director, Shipbuilding and Ship Machinery Division, Maritime 
Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism  
 Mr. Shin Imai, Director of International Office, Ocean Development and 
Environment Policy Division, Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism  
 Mr. Akira Fukaishi, First Secretary, Alternate Permanent Representative of Japan 
to IMO, Embassy of Japan, London  
 Alternates  
 Mr. Yasufumi Onishi, Director for Environment Policy, Ocean Development and 
Environment Policy Division, Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism  
 Mr. Yasuhiro Urano, Ocean Development and Environment Policy Division, 
Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism  
 Mr. Kohei Iwaki, Special Assistant to the Director, Ocean Development and 
Environment Policy Division, Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism  
 Comdt. Bhim Singh, Director (Enviornment and Fisheries), Indian Coast Guard, 
New Delhi  
 Mr. Satish Devdas Kamath, Engineer and Ship Surveyor, Engineering Wing  
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Mr. Katsuya Shimizu, Chief Examiner, Inspection and Measurement Division, 
Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism  
 Mr. Kiyoto Inoue, Director, International Ocean Affairs, Ocean Policy Division, 
Policy Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism  
 Mr. Keisuke Yamane, Special Assistant to the Director, Marine Environment 
Protection and Disaster Prevention Division, Guard and Rescue Department, Japan 
Coast Guard  
 Mr. Yosuke Murata, Chief, Office of Marine Environment, Water Environment 
Division, Environmental Management Bureau, Ministry of the Environment  
 Mr. Takafumi Horiuchi, Inspection and Measurement Division, Maritime Bureau, 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism  
 Advisers  
 Dr. Susumu Ota, Director, Centre for International Cooperation, National 
Maritime Research Institute, National Institute of Maritime, Port and Aviation 
Technology  
 Mr. Kenichi Kume, Senior Researcher, Fluids Engineering and Hull Design 
Department, National Maritime Research Institute, National Institute of Maritime, 
Port and Aviation Technology  
 Dr. Ryuji Miyake, Manager, Hull Department, Plan Approval Division, Nippon 
Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK)  
 Mr. Yasunobu Araki, Manager, Ship Management Sysyems Department, Nippon 
Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK)  
 Dr. Koichi Yoshida, Director, Technology Department, Ship Equipment 
Inspection Society of Japan (HK)  
 Mr. Seiichi Tanaka, Chairman, Japan Ship Technology Research Association  
 Mr. Yasuhisa Mitani, Managing Director, Japan Ship Technology Research 
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Association  
 Mr. Sadaharu Koga, Manager, Regulations Unit, Japan Ship Technology 
Research Association  
 Mr. Yusuke Kawai, Regulation Team Staff, Regulation Unit, Japan Ship 
Technology Research Association  
 Mr. Kazuyoshi Hirota, Japan Ship Technology Research Association  
 Mr. Takashi Yamamoto, Japan Ship Technology Research Association  
 Dr. Qing He, Japan Ship Technology Research Association  
 Mr. Takashi Yonezawa, Japan Ship Technology Research Association  
 Mr. Seijiro Morimoto, Senior Researcher, Planning and Research Department, 
Japan Maritime Center  
 Mr. Masahiro Takahashi, Chairman of GHG Taskforce, The Japanese 
Shipowners' Association  
 Mr. Hirohiko Oyabu, Member of GHG Task Force, The Japanese Shipowners' 
Association  
 Mr. Masaki Nakagawa, The Japanese Shipowners’ Association  
 Ms. Kumiko Iwasa, Member of GHG Task Force, The Japanese Shipowners' 
Association  
 Mr. Tamio Kawashima, General Manager of Europe District Branch, The 
Japanese Shipowners' Association  
 Cdr. Keiji Takechi, Director, London Research Office, The Japan Association of 
Marine Safety  
 Mr. Takeshi Mizunari, Senior Researcher, Marine Pollution Prevention Research 
Department, The Japan Association of Marine Safety  
 Mr. Katsumi Yoshida, Chief Manager, Laboratory of Aquatic Science Consultant 
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Co., Ltd.  
 Dr. Takuro Omura, Chief Scientist, Laboratory of Aquatic Science Consultant 
Co., Ltd.  
 Mr. Akira Sugawara, Senior Researcher, Research Institute for Environmental 
Strategies, Inc.  
 Ms. Liliana Martinez Rivera, Analyst, Research Institute for Environmental 
Strategies, Inc.  
 Mr. Yasuhiro Ueda, Director, Japan Ship Centre (JETRO)  
 Mr. Takanori Maeda, Director, Japan Ship Centre (JETRO)  
 Mr. Takuya Minato, Director, Japan Ship Centre (JETRO) 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
 Head of Delegation  
 Mr. Yury Melenas, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to IMO, 
Mission of the Russian Federation to IMO, London  
 Alternates  
 Mr. Alexander Poshivay, Deputy Head, Federal Agency "Rosmorrechflot"  
 Mr. Murad Nasrutdinov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian 
Federation to IMO, Mission of the Russian Federation to IMO, London  
 Advisers  
 Mr. Sergey Tolmachev, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation 
to IMO, London  
 Mr. Alexander Suvorov, Head of Ships, Service Department, Russian Maritime 
Register of Shipping  
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UKRAINE  
 Head of Delegation  
 Mr. Vitalii Moshkivskyi, Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of 
Ukraine to IMO, Embassy of Ukraine, London  
   
UNITED KINGDOM  
 Head of Delegation  
 Mr. Viktor Grishkin, Principal Specialist, Head of Section, Russian Maritime 
Register of Shipping  
 Ms. Olga Tsyrkun, С hief Specialist Expert, Federal Agency of Maritime and 
River Transport  
 Mrs. Natalia Kutaeva, Counsellor to the Director, MRS, Federal Agency of 
Maritime and River Transport  
 Mr. Vladimir Shurpyak, Senior Principal Surveyor, Machinery Department, 
Russian Maritime Register of Shipping  
 Mr. Nikolay Stupakov, PSCO Saint Petersburg, FSBI "The Administration of the 
Baltic Sea Ports"  
 Mr. Ilya Ivanov, Senior Surveyor, Machinery Department, Russian Maritime 
Register of Shipping  
 Mr. Dmitry Yudin, Senior State Inspector, FSBI “Administration of the Western 
Arctic Seaports”  




 Miss Katy Ware, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to IMO and Director of Maritime Safety and 
Standards, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Alternates  
 Mr. Gwilym Stone, Assistant Director, Ship Standards, Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency (MCA)  
 Mr. Kevin Hunter, International Relations Manager (Technical), International 
Liaison Branch, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Advisers  
 Ms. Claire McAllister, Assistant Director, Maritime Safety and Environment, 
Department for Transport (DfT)  
 Ms. Katie Carleton, Head, Maritime International Environment and Climate 
Change, Department for Transport (DfT)  
 Ms. Morna Cannon, Senior Policy Adviser, International Environment and 
Climate Change, Department for Transport (DfT)  
 Mr. Ian Timpson, Senior Policy Adviser, Ship Emissions and Recycling, Maritime 
Safety and Environment Division (MSE), Department for Transport (DfT)  
 Ms. Paula Spencer, Senior Policy Adviser, International Environment and Climate 
Change, Maritime Safety and Environment Division (MSE), Department for 
Transport (DfT)  
 Mr. Jonathan Simpson, Head, Environmental Policy, Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency (MCA)  
 Mr. David MacRae, Environmental Policy Specialist, Environmental Policy 
Branch, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Mr. Bennett Ng, Environmental Policy Specialist, Environmental Policy Branch, 
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
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 Ms. Anna Ziou, Policy Director, UK Chamber of Shipping  
 Mr. Owen Bellamy, Policy Adviser, Committee on Climate Change  
 Ms. Yue Yao, Principal Specialist in Charge, Statutory Section, Lloyd’s Register 
Asia  
 Dr. Zabi Bazari, Managing Director, Energy and Emissions Solutions  
 Mr. Sam Wright, EU Lead, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Mr. Adam Laidouci, Second Secretary - Transport, UK Representative Brussels, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)  
   
UNITED STATES  
 Head of Delegation  
 Mr. Jeffrey G. Lantz, Director, Commercial Regulations and Standards, United 
States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security  
 Representatives  
 Mr. Wayne M. Lundy, Systems Engineering Division, Office of Design and 
Engineering Standards, United States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland 
Security  
 Mr. Christopher Laroo, Environmental Scientist, Transportation and Air Quality 
Office, Environmental Protection Agency  
 Advisers  
 Ms. Trisha Bergmann, International Affairs Specialist, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration  
 Capt. Sean Brady, Office of Operating and Environmental Standards, 
Commercial, United States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security  
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 Lt. Cdr. Joel Coito, Coast Guard Liaison Officer, Department of State  
 Dr. Lisa Drake, Scientist, Naval Research Laboratory, Department of the Navy  
 Dr. Richard Everett, Biologist, Environmental Standards Division, United States 
Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security  
 Ms. Hayley Gillooly, Foreign Affairs, State Department  
 Ms. Neha Lugo, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State  
 Mr. Dale Murad, Attorney/Adviser, United States Coast Guard, Department of 
Homeland Security  
 Mr. Andrew Rakestraw, Office of Global Change, Department of State 
 Ms. Debra DiCianna, Private Consultant, Eastern Research Group, Inc., (ERG) 
 Mr. Joseph Gardemal, Senior Principal Engineer, American Bureau of Shipping 
 Mr. Robert Hughes, Americas Operations and Global Technical Manager, Ocean 
Transportation, Gargill, Inc. 
 Mr. Theodore J. Tarabulski, Regulatory Consultant, Caterpillar Inc. 
 Mr. James Weakley, President, Lake Carrier's Association 
 Ms. Dena Brownlow, Counsellor for Environment, Science, Technology and 
Health, Permanent Representative of the United States of America to IMO, 
Embassy of the United States of America, London 
  
 MSC 99 
BRAZIL  
 Head of Delegation  
 Adm. Sergio Roberto Fernandes dos Santos, Brazilian Permanent 
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Representative to IMO, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO  
 Representative  
 H.E. Mr. Hermano Telles Ribeiro, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of 
Brazil to International Organizations in London, Permanent Representation of 
Brazil to International Organizations in London  
Alternates  
 Capt. Carlos Henrique de Lima Zampieri, Alternate Permanent Representative 
of Brazil to IMO, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO 
 Ms. Ana Paula Simões Silva, Minister Counsellor, Alternate Permanent 
Representative of Brazil to IMO, Permanent Representation of Brazil to 
International Organizations in London 
Advisers 
 R. Adm. (Rtd.) Francisco Carlos Ortiz de Holanda Chaves, Executive Secretary, 
Brazilian Navy, Executive Support Unit for the Coordinating Committee for IMO 
Matters 
 Capt. Marcello Gama, Division Assistant, Navy Staff  
 Capt. (Rtd.) Jorge Mauro Fiorito, Maritime Adviser, Executive Support Unit for 
the Coordinating Committee for IMO Matters, Brazilian Navy  
 Cdr. André  Ricardo Araujo Silva, Mission Officer, Brazilian Permanent 
Representation to IMO  
 Mr. Nilson José Lima, Chief Engineer Officer (Merchant Marine), Mission 
Officer, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO  
 Mr. Heiland Serotiuk Lyrio, Technical Officer, Brazilian Permanent 
Representation to IMO 
 Mrs. Ellen Mucke, Technical Officer, Brazilian Permanent Representation to 
IMO 
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 Ms. Marcia Jorio Villares da Costa, Technical Officer, Brazilian Permanent 
Representation to IMO  
 Mr. Marcelo Campello Cajaty Gonçalves, Pilot, Brazilian Pilots' Association  
 Mr. Luis Adelson Dantas, Marine Engineer (Technical Consultant), Brazilian 
Petroleum Company (PETROBRAS) 




 Head of Delegation  
 Representative  
 Mr. Zan Yang, Maritime Counsellor, Embassy of the People's Republic of 
China, London  
 Alternates  
 Mr. Xiaojie Zhang, Deputy Director General, Department of International 
Cooperation, Ministry of Transport  
 Mr. HongYin Li, Deputy Director General, China Maritime Safety 
Administration, Ministry of Transport  
 Mr. Feng Sun, Vice President, China Classification Society (CCS)  
 Advisers  
 Mr. Xingsen Chen, Section Chief, International Cooperation  
 Mr. Hui Xie, Director, China Maritime Safety Administration  
 Mr. Bo Ning, Deputy Director, China Maritime Safety Administration  
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 Mr. Yikang Shen, Senior Engineer, Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration  
 Mr. Zhirong Wang, Director, Technical Management Department  
 Ms. Zhe Li, Zhejiang Maritime Safety Administration  
 Mr. Yuliang Cai, Deputy General Manager, China Classification Society (CCS)  
 Mr. Wu Sun, Engineer, China Classification Society (CCS)  
 Mr. Gaofeng Zhang, Senior Engineer, China Classification Society (CCS)  
 Mr. Renping Zhang, Director, Dalian Maritime University  
 Mr. Yingjun Zhang, Professor, Dalian Maritime Safety Administration  
 Mr. Kangxu Ren, Manager, Shanghai Shipbuilding Technology Research 
Institute   
 Mr. Xin Li, Director, Shanghai Merchant Ship Design and Research Institute  
 Mr. Jusheng Hu, Manager, China Shipping (Group) Company 
 Mr. Hongjun Li, Director, Beijing Satellite Navigation Centre (BSNC) 
 Mr. Caibo Hu, Senior Engineer, Beijing Satellite Navigation Centre (BSNC)  
 Dr. Xiaodong Zhang, First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of 
China, London 
 Mr. Li Tao, First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, London 
  
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
 Head of Delegation  
 Mr. Hyon Il Nam, Deputy Director-General, Maritime Administration  
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 Representatives  
 Mr. Kwang Min Kim, Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to IMO, Embassy of the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, London  
 Mr. Jun Hyok Im, Counsellor, Alternate Permanent Representative of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to IMO, Embassy of the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, London  
 Alternate  
 Mr. Chung Song Kim, Senior Officer, Maritime Administration  
  
INDIA  
 Head of Delegation  
 Mr. Suresh Kumar R.M., Chief Ship Surveyor, Directorate General of Shipping, 
Ministry of Shipping  
 Representatives  
 Dr. Aseem Vohra, Second Secretary Political, International Organization and 
Education, High Commission of India, London  
 Mr. Praveen Kumar Mishra, Vice President, Indian Register of Shipping  
 Mr. Sandeep Singh, Attaché, High Commission of India, London  
  
JAPAN  
 Head of Delegation  
 Mr. Jotaro Horiuchi, Minister of Transport, Alternate Permanent Representative 
of Japan to IMO, Embassy of Japan, London  
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 Representatives  
 Mr. Yuji Mori, Director, Ship Safety Standards Office, Safety Policy Division, 
Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism  
 Mr. Akira Fukaishi, First Secretary, Alternate Permanent Representative of 
Japan to IMO, Embassy of Japan, London  
Ms. Hiroyo Hiramatsu, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan, London  
 Alternates  
 Mr. Tomoyasu Izaki, Director, International Affairs, Seafarers Policy Division, 
Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism  
 Cdr. Hideki Noguchi, Deputy Director, International Affairs and Technical 
Development Office, Administration and Planning Division, Maritime Traffic 
Department, Japan Coast Guard  
 Mr. Yasuhiko Kawazu, Deputy Director, Cabinet Office  
 Mr. Koki Matsushima, Chief, Seafarers Policy Division, Maritime Bureau, 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism  
 Mr. Tomotsugu Noma, Chief, Ship Safety Standards Office, Safety Policy 
Division, Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism  
 Mr. Satoshi Usada, Chief, Ship Safety Standards Office, Safety Policy Division, 
Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism  
 Ms. Yukie Yajima, Engineer, Cabinet Office  
 Advisers  
 Dr. Susumu Ota, Director, Centre for International Cooperation, National 
Maritime Research Institute, National Institute of Maritime, Port and Aviation 
Technology  
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 Capt. Masashi Sugomori, Senior Coordinator, International Affairs Division, 
Knowledge Capital Department, Japan Agency of Maritime Education and 
Training for Seafarers  
 Dr. Koichi Yoshida, Director, Technical Department, Ship Equipment Inspection 
Society of Japan (HK)  
 Mr. Hironori Eguro, Regulations Team Staff, Regulations Unit, Japan Ship 
Technology Research Association  
 Mr. Takumi Yoshida, Japan Ship Technology Research Association  
 Mr. Takuya Nakashima, Japan Ship Technology Research Association  
 Dr. Toshiro Arima, Director, Rule Development and ICT Division, Nippon Kaiji 
Kyokai (Class NK)  
 Mr. Satoshi Sasaki, Manager, Machinery Rules Development Department, Rule 
Development and ICT Division, Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK)  
 Mr. Kenshi Yoshimura, Surveyor, Hull Rules Development Department, Rule 
Development and ICT Division, Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK)  
 Capt. Tomonori Okamura, Chief Researcher, Technology and Research 
Department, The Maritime Human Resource Institute  
 Mr. Koji Tomioka, The Shipbuilders' Association of Japan (SAJ)  
 Mr. Shinji Takiguchi, The Shipbuilders' Association of Japan (SAJ)  
 Mr. Tamio Kawashima, General Manager, Europe District Branch, The Japanese 
Shipowners' Association  
 Mr. Masaru Kashima, Deputy General Manager, Marine Division, The Japanese 
Shipowners' Association  
   
Cdr. Keiji Takechi, Director, London Research Office, The Japan Association of 
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Marine Safety  
 Cdr. Masahiro Kurohara, Manager, International Office, The Japan Association 
of Marine Safety  
 Mr. Yoshihiro Toyomitsu, Deputy Director, International Affairs Bureau, All 
Japan Seamen's Union  
 Mr. Nobuyuki Ito, Manager, Marine Electronics Engineering Department, 
Marine Systems Division, Japan Radio Co., Ltd.  
 Mr. Daiju Ichinose, Manager, QZSS Promotion Office, NEC Corporation  
 Mr. Yoshiyuki Murai, Senior Technical Marketing Specialist, KANEMATSU 
Corporation  
  
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
 Head of Delegation  
 Dr. Vitaly Klyuev, Director, Department of State Policy for Maritime and River 
Transport, Ministry of Transport  
 Alternates  
 Mr. Yury Melenas, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to 
IMO, Mission of the Russian Federation to IMO, London  
 Mr. Murad Nasrutdinov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian 
Federation to IMO, Mission of the Russian Federation to IMO, London  
 Advisers  
 Mr. Dmitry Mostovshchikov, Senior Principal Surveyor, Ships in Service 
Department, Russian Maritime Register of Shipping  
 Mr. Sergey Tolmachev, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian 
Federation to IMO, London  
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 Mr. Vladimir Korenev, Senior Surveyor of Murmansk Branch, Russian 
Maritime Register of Shipping  
 Mr. Yury Pankrashkin, Deputy Head of Department, Department for Provision 
of Navigation, Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transport  
 Mr. Denis Pavlov, Principal Surveyor of Murmansk Branch, Russian Maritime 
Register of Shipping  
 Mr. Vladimir Kuzmin, PSC Officer, FSBI "The Administration of the Baltic 
Sea Ports"  
 Mr. Igor Khocholava, Harbour Master of Tuapse Port, FSBI "The 
Administration of the Baltic Sea Ports"  
 Prof. Sergey Kondratiev, Rector, Admiral Ushakov State Maritime University  
 Dr. Vladimir Vasilyev, Deputy Director General, Central Marine Research and 
Design Institute  
 Capt. Viktor Chernov, First Deputy Head, Maritime Rescue Service  
  
UKRAINE  
 Head of Delegation  
 H.E. Ms. Natalia Galibarenko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, 
Permanent Representative of Ukraine to IMO, Embassy of Ukraine, London  
 Representatives  
 Mr. Andriy Galushchak, State Secretary, Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine  
 Mr. Vitalii Moshkivskyi, Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of 
Ukraine to IMO, Embassy of Ukraine, London  
 Mr. Oleksandr Basiuk, Director, Department of Reform and Functioning of 
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Maritime and Inland Water Transport, Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine  
 Ms. Viktoriia Gulenko, First Secretary, Directorate General for International 
Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine  
 Mr. Yaroslav Iliasevych, Head of Unit, Department of Reform and Functioning 
of Maritime and Inland Water Transport, Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine  
 Mr. Volodymyr Kolosyuk, Deputy Head of Operations, Ukrainian Sea Ports 
Authority  
 Mr. Viacheslav Voloshyn, Head of Chornomorsk Branch, Ukrainian Sea Ports 
Authority  
 Capt. Mykola Sevyrin, Head of Maritime Safety and Environmental Protection 
Department, Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority  
 Mr. Andriy Grygoryev, Deputy Head of Maritime Safety and Environmental 
Protection Department, Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority  
 Mr. Dmytro Nahaievskyi, Senior Specialist, Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority  
 Mr. Volodymyr Rabotnov, Deputy Director, Secretary of the State Coordination 
Committee, Marine Search and Rescue Service  
 Capt. Stanislav Nezavitin, Harbour Master, Port of Chornomorsk  
 Mr. Oleksii Stepanov, Deputy Head, Information Support Centre, Marine 
Search and Rescue Service  
  
UNITED KINGDOM  
 Head of Delegation  
 Miss Katy Ware, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to IMO and Director of Maritime Safety and 
Standards, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
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 Alternates  
 Mr. Gwilym Stone, Assistant Director, Ship Standards, Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Mr. Kevin Hunter, International Relations Manager (Technical), International 
Liaison Branch, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Advisers  
 Mr. Edward Statton, Policy Adviser, International Shipping and Counter Piracy, 
Maritime Security and Resilience Division, Department for Transport (DfT)  
 Mr. Glenn Richardson, Assistant Director, Business Governance, Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Ms. Katrina Kemp, Smart Ships and Automation Policy Officer, International 
Liaison Branch, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Mr. Ronald Allen, Policy Lead, Stability, Marine Technology Branch, Maritime 
and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Mr. Simon Owens, Policy Lead, Fire Safety and Engineering, Marine 
Technology Branch, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Mr. Nico Ramos, Policy Lead, Life Saving Appliances, Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
 Ms. Fena Boyle, Nautical Manager, UK Chamber of Shipping  
 Mr. Anderson Chaplow, Senior Specialist, Marine, Lloyd’s Register EMEA  
 Mr. Andrew Sillitoe, Lead Specialist, Regulatory Affairs, Lloyd's Register 
EMEA  
 Dr. Jack Corbett, Associate Professor in Politics, Politics and International 
Relations, University of Southampton  
 Mr. John Dodd, Director of Safety and Standards Maritime, Inmarsat  
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 Mr. Robert Carington, Policy Adviser, UK Chamber of Shipping  
 Mr. Rakesh Pandit, Nautical Policy Lead, Navigation Safety, Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA)  
  
 UNITED STATES  
 Head of Delegation  
 R. Adm. John Nadeau, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, United 
States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security  
 Representatives  
 Mr. Jeffrey G. Lantz, Director, Commercial Regulations and Standards, United 
States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security  
 Ms. Trisha Bergmann, International Affairs Specialist, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration  
 Lt. Cdr. Joel Coito, Coast Guard Liaison Officer, Department of State  
 Capt. Albert Janin, Admiralty Counsel of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate 
General Naval League Service Command  
 Cdr. Jason Levy, Oceans Policy Adviser, The Pentagon-Office of the Secretary of 
Defense  
 Ms. Mayte Medina, Chief, Maritime Personnel Qualifications Division, 
Commercial Regulations and Standards Directorate, United States Coast Guard, 
Department of Homeland Security  
 Cdr. John Miller, Chief, Systems Engineering Division, United States Coast 
Guard, Department of Homeland Security  
 Mr. Cameron Naron, Adviser, Department of Transportation  
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 Lt. Cdr. Jeffrey Noyes, Attorney Adviser, Prevention Law Division, Office of 
Maritime and International Law, United States Coast Guard, Department of 
Homeland Security  
 Mr. Gregory J. O'Brien, Senior Oceans Policy Adviser, Office of Ocean and Polar 
Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
Department of State  
 Mr. Jaideep Sirkar, Chief, Naval Architecture Division, Office of Design and 
Engineering Standards, United States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland 
Security  
 Mr. Louis Bell, Electronics Engineer, Federal Communications Commission  
 Advisers  
 Ms. Nina Beebe, Director, Emerging Markets, Access Partnership  
 Mr. Bryan Hartin, Executive Vice President, Iridium  
 Ms. Dena Brownlow, Counsellor for Environment, Science, Technology and 
Health, Permanent Representative of the United States of America to IMO, 
Embassy of the United States of America, London  
 Ms. Tatiana Lawrence, Vice President, International Regulatory Affairs, Iridium  
    
 ※ Some States such as Sierra Leon or Tonga failed to send their delegations to 




* * *  
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Appendix 2 Non-governmental Organizations in Consultative Status by 
Interests/Activities 
(Categories as approved by C 108 － Related documents: 15(d)/1 and D) 





22 Further information is given in the IMO website: https://docs.imo.org/Category.aspx?cid=746 
 102 
 
 103 
 
 104 
 
 
 105 
 
 106 
______________ 
